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**CABINET**

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**COMMUNISM IN COUNTRIES OUTSIDE THE SOVIET ORBIT**

**NOTE BY THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS**

I circulate herewith, for the information of my colleagues, a survey of Communism in countries outside the Soviet orbit, which brings up to date and supersedes the survey circulated with C.P. (48) 223, except the section on China.

E. B.

*Foreign Office, S.W. 1,  
24th March, 1949.*



# SURVEY OF COMMUNISM IN COUNTRIES OUTSIDE THE SOVIET ORBIT

Reports on the following countries are attached:—

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2. The information in the reports is in the form, where applicable, of answers to the following *questionnaire*:—

1. Is there a legal Communist Party?
2. What is its actual membership?
3. What is its percentage of the total population?
4. What is its percentage of the electorate?
5. Has it members in the national Parliament, and what percentage?
6. Has it members in the national Government?
7. What votes has it recorded in recent elections, national or local?
8. What is the extent of its influence in the armed forces?
9. What is the extent of its influence in the police?
10. What is the extent of its influence in the Civil Service?
11. What is the extent of its influence in the trade unions?
12. Are there any known contacts between its leaders and Soviet Russia?
13. Are there any known contacts between its leaders and Communists in neighbouring countries?
14. What are its potentialities as a fifth-column?



## FRANCE

1. The Communist Party in France is legal. It is, in fact, the largest single party in the elected Chamber, the *Assemblée Nationale* (Lower House), and therefore it is unlikely that, short of a war with Russia—or a near catastrophic situation leading to a dissolution and a de Gaulle “dictatorship”—the legality of the Party will be questioned.

Under the stress of war conditions, it is true, the Party was outlawed on 26th September, 1939, by the Daladier Government, which ordered its dissolution with the concurrence of the other groups represented in the *Chambre des Députés*. At the same time the Government placed a ban on the publication and distribution of all Communist propaganda material.

2. *Membership of the Party*.—Figures of the actual membership of the Party, as distinct from the Communist-controlled C.G.T., are not easily available. At the end of 1946 the estimated figure was 815,000 approximately. It is possible that the figure of *militants* to-day (the end of 1948) has decreased somewhat. There are, of course, several welfare and charitable organisations of a “fellow-traveller” character controlled by Communists, and a small section of the Socialist Party (S.F.I.O.) might, in certain circumstances, co-operate actively with the P.C.F. (*Parti Communiste Français*). During January 1949 the *Union Républicaine et Résistante*, numbering eight Deputies, and affiliated to the Communists, have decided to act as a separate party, with possibly a less intransigent policy.

3. *Percentage of the Electorate*.—28·2 per cent. (see 6 *infra*).

4. Number of Members in the *Assemblée Nationale* is 168 out of a total of 621 Deputies. In the *Conseil de la République* (Upper House), the party's representation has been cut down during the recent elections of November 1948 from 84 (out of 315), councillors to 21 (out of 320). The decrease is, however, largely due to the substitution of a majority vote for P.R. in many electoral districts, an alteration which penalised the Communists who were unwilling to form electoral alliances. They still probably control about 20 per cent. of the electorate, but a change in the electoral system might reduce their representation in the Assembly also.

5. Communist Ministers were bowed out of the quadripartite coalition Government of M. Ramadier in May 1947, when Communist Deputies, including the Ministers, chose to vote against the Government on economic policy and also on the Government's policy in Indo-China. In the present Government under the Constitution, the Communists would be offered posts in a caretaker Government, formed after dissolution of the National Assembly until a new Assembly is elected.

6. Voting strength in the general election of November 1946 was 5,475,955 (Metropolitan France only). Overall results of the municipal elections of October 1947 gave the Communists no more than 6·9 per cent. of the seats. At the second ballot, in many cases, they forfeited nearly 25 per cent. of their municipal councillorships and a majority of the *mairies* previously held by Communists.

7. *Influence in the Armed Forces*.—In the first two and a half years after the Liberation the Communists exerted considerable influence in the armed forces. This was due partly to the prominent position they had acquired during the Resistance period, partly to the strong position they occupied then in the political system. It has to be borne in mind that, in the coalition Governments to which France appeared to be committed indefinitely by the electoral law, Ministries are largely party strongholds. General de Gaulle's coalition Governments, the Gouin and Bidault Administrations of 1946, as well as the quadripartite coalition, after the general elections of November 1946, all contained Communist Ministers through whose influence Communists were infiltrated into key-positions. M. Tillon, Minister of Armaments, was able to secure control over the arsenals. But the extrusion of Communist Ministers from the Ramadier Government in May 1947 put a very different complexion on the matter. To-day, while Communist agents are perhaps more active than ever in their attempts to gain a hold over the serving soldier by propaganda—the Central Committee of the Party is known to attach great importance to propaganda in the forces which is under the charge of M. Raoul Calas—Communist influence in the direction of Armed Forces, Army,

Navy or Air Force has been reduced considerably. It should be noted, however, that scientific and armament research, and production are penetrated by avowed Communists, an outstanding example being that of Professor Joliot-Curie, in charge of Atomic Research.

8. *Influence in the Police.*—In the immediate post-war period, similarly, Communists held many important positions in the police. But recent Governments, with Communists excluded, have been able to effect considerable "purging"; i.e., pensioning off of persons who obtained high appointments, outside the normal hierarchy, at the time of the Liberation. To-day, even in the Paris police, Communists are probably not much more than 20 per cent.

9. *Influence in the Civil Service.*—The same trajectory is to be observed. But the strength of Communist influence in the civil service is still substantial, particularly in the nationalised industries, although efforts have been made in the departments, especially the Ministry of Labour, to prevent Communists holding important posts.

10. *Influence in the Trade Unions.*—The principal trade union federation, the C.G.T., *Confédération Générale du Travail*, which is Communist-controlled, numbers some 2,500,000, although this figure may have been considerably reduced by the violent tactics adopted by C.P. during the miners' strike, which alienated many workers. Communist representation is strong on the joint factory committees which are compulsory in all enterprises employing more than 50 workers. Since December last year, when the failure of the strikes showed that the rank-and-file of French workers were "fed up" with being dragged into political agitation, Communist leaders have done their utmost to revive the so-called "Communist fractions" in the trade unions. But they have not been altogether successful. Communist influence in the trade unions, while it will continue strong, has probably passed its meridian. An estimate by M. Bennoit-Frachon, Secretary-General of the C.G.T., early in 1948 that the number of paying members of the C.G.T. would shortly be in the region of five million is a sheer flight of fancy.

11. *Contacts between French Communist Leaders and Soviet Russia.*—Maurice Thorez, Secretary-General of the Communist Party since before the War, is Moscow-trained and is reported to have got on particularly well with Stalin. He spent some years in Russia during the War, after deserting from the French Army. While he does his best to follow the party line—e.g., the noticeable shift of tactics following the "Cominform" meeting in September 1947, of which his speech on 29th October at a meeting of the Central Committee of the Party was the reflection—he is said to have shown rather too much independent spirit to be completely in the good grace of the Kremlin. Other leaders more under the thumb of Moscow like MM. Marty and Casanova have nothing like the prestige or ability of Thorez.

12. *Contacts with Leaders in Neighbouring Countries.*—There is no evidence that French Communist Party leaders depend from day to day or week to week on instructions from Moscow. In the recent coal strike, December 1948, there appear, however, good grounds for assuming that they were being both advised and subsidised by Moscow. They are well trained—and there is always the Russian press and wireless. Some attempt was made late 1948 to synchronise tactics and developments with the Italian Communist Party, and in late November Togliatti was thought to have visited France to "check up" on the possibility of relating military and sabotage operations in South-Eastern France with similar developments in North-West Italy; but on the whole, the French Communist Party has few links with other Communist Parties—except, of course, through membership of the Cominform. At times Moscow seeks to use the French Communist Party as the main outpost of Communism in Western Europe—e.g., for directives to the parties in the Low Countries.

13. *Military Organisation of the Party.*—As to the potentialities of the P.C.F. as a "Fifth Column," exaggerated ideas are held on this. The best estimate of underground military strength is between 100,000 and 150,000. Of those who vote "Communist" in the elections not all would, in fact, in the event of a war between the Soviet Union and the West, go out and fight for, or indeed give any sort of aid to, Soviet Russia. But the probability of effective "fifth column" activities should not be lightly dismissed. In an all-out effort the



Communist Party could dislocate national life for a period and achieve an effective if only temporary stoppage of any war effort.

In a country like France with a long-standing political tradition it is inconceivable that the *electoral* strength of the Communist Party should indicate that the nation is hell-bent for a journey along the Moscow road. It is an important fact, however, which should never be overlooked, that the Communist Party *has* established itself firmly in France as the workers' party (particularly but not exclusively industrial workers), supplanting the S.F.I.O., which, after supporting a series of coalition Governments, has abandoned in some measure the traditional principles of French socialism, and thus compromised itself with many of the working class. Whatever happens in the Parliamentary arena, this position is unlikely to change: this "Labourism," which gives French Communism its strength, has come to stay.

## BELGIUM

1. Yes. The Communist Party is legal.

2. *Membership of the Party*.—100,000 at the beginning of 1948 (108,000 in September 1945: 10,000 before the war). The Party machine is undergoing thorough overhaul, necessitated by this ten-fold expansion; and it was hoped to recruit 5,000 branch secretaries by the end of 1948. These, in turn, were expected to recruit some 50,000 "*militants sûrs et dévoués*." Of the present Party total, it is almost certain that an appreciable number have not paid their dues.

3. *Percentage of Total Population*.—1.2 per cent. (the population is approximately 8,300,000).

4. *Percentage of the Electorate*.—Electorate figure unknown; but the Party polled 12.7 per cent. of the total votes—2,365,638—cast at the General Election of February 1946.

5. *Representation in Parliament*.—23 Deputies in the Chamber of Representatives (9 before the war) out of a total of 202, or 11.4 per cent.; and 17 Senators in the Senate (3 before the war) out of a total of 167, or 10.2 per cent.

6. *Membership of Government*.—Not since M. Spaak took office with a Christian Social-Socialist coalition in March 1947. The left-wing Cabinet of his predecessor, M. Huysmans, included 4 Communists. The present Cabinet, formed by M. Spaak in November 1948, retains its two-party basis.

7. *Voting Strength*.—300,099 votes were polled for Communist candidates at the General Election of February 1946.

8. *Influence in the Armed Forces*.—No evidence of any influence.

9. *Influence in the Police*.—Very small influence—perhaps negligible.

10. *Influence in the Civil Service*.—Unknown; but the impression is that it is inconsiderable.

11. *Influence in Trade Unions*.—Communist penetration of Trade Unions, previously estimated to be about 30 per cent., has since declined considerably. There is no Communist influence whatsoever in the Christian (Catholic) Trade Union Confederation; and present strength of Communism in the (Socialist) Belgian Confederation of Labour is estimated at not more than 15 per cent. of total membership. As the result of determined efforts to deny them influential positions, Communists now hold no places either on the National Secretariat or on the General Council. Only five of the numerous Communist Unions (*Syndicats uniques*) formed during the occupation continue to exist. All are affiliated to the Belgian Federation of Labour. With the exception of the Quarrymen's *Syndicat unique*, their influence is small. In the other Unions of the Belgian Federation of Labour, a few subordinate official posts are held by Communists. This is a concession to the principle of Trade Union unity; but, in any case, these Communist officials are under continuous supervision by reliable Socialists. The systematic elimination of Communists from official posts in the Metalworkers' Union and the Public Services Federation—the two largest Unions affiliated to the Federation of Labour—has much reduced the Party's influence in them. It

was in these two Unions that, not very long ago, Communist influence was greatest. These setbacks in the Trade Unions have not, however, dissuaded them from taking every opportunity to make capital out of the workers' grievances. It is known that during 1948 the Party was instructed to begin immediate infiltration of the building and electrical industries (including power-stations), using the methods which proved so successful in Czechoslovakia. Those engaged in these activities were issued with a document known as *Le Carnet de l'Homme de Confiance*, which is believed to be identical with a document issued to *militants* in Czechoslovakia. Infiltration of other industries was also to begin; but so far these have not been specified.

12. *Contacts between Belgian Communist Leaders and Soviet Russia*.—Unknown.

13. *Contacts with Leaders in Neighbouring Countries*.—There was a meeting on 4th January, 1948, between two members of the Central Committee of the Belgian Communist Party—Julien Lahaut, President of the Party, and Jean Bertrand, National Secretary—and an unnamed delegate from the French Communist Party. The meeting was held for the purpose of planning concerted action in the event of international conflict; and it is believed that the selection of points along the Franco-Belgian frontier at which French or alien Communist "refugees" could enter Belgium secretly and form a *maquis* on the Belgian side, and the question of supplies for the proposed *maquis*, were among the subjects discussed.

14. *Military Organisation of the Party*.—While there is some sign of paramilitary activity, the Belgian authorities are of the opinion that the Belgian Communist Party is not in a position to initiate any revolutionary action in the near future. Early in 1948, however, French and Belgian Communist elements were reported to be smuggling arms and explosives by rail from France to Belgium. Of the former Resistance groups, the Communist-dominated *Front de l'Indépendance* remains the most highly organised and most vocal; it is not known whether it is armed.

## THE NETHERLANDS

1. The Communist Party is legal. (Established in 1909.) It is called *Communistische Partij Nederland* (C.P.N.).

2. Party leaders announced the membership as 53,000 on 1st September, 1947. A recent estimate suggests that it has fallen to about 50,000.

3. Membership represents about .54 per cent. of the total population.

4. Total of electorate 5,444,735 (July 1948). Communist poll at the General Election of July 1948 was 7.74 per cent. of a total poll of 4,933,735 (10.6 per cent. of a total poll of 4,760,711 in May 1946).

5. There are eight members in the Second (Lower) Chamber out of 100, or 8 per cent. (10 in May 1946; 3 before the war).

6. No Communist has ever served in a Dutch Cabinet.

7. The Party polled 381,953 votes at the General Election of July 1948 (502,963 in May 1946).

8. Influence in Armed Forces is believed to be nil. Unsuccessful attempts were made by the Communist Party to persuade troops to desert on the eve of their departure for the Netherlands East Indies in 1946.

9. Influence in the Police is believed to be very small.

10. There is no information as to influence in the Civil Service.

11. At one time Communist penetration of the trade unions was estimated at about 30 per cent.; but recently the Party has lost much ground—even in the so-called "Unity Trade Union," which it founded soon after the war and which it dominates. This union hoped to capture waverers and malcontents from the powerful Catholic and Socialist Unions, but in this it was mainly unsuccessful; although—until the *coup* in Czechoslovakia—its ranks included a certain number



of left-wing Socialist elements and others. These have since broken away and the strength of the Unity Union is now principally derived from the Rotterdam and Amsterdam dock-workers, who, in any case, provided its original membership. The Communist trade-union strength has recently been estimated at 100-120,000 as against 850,000 in the non-Communist unions.

12. The General Secretary of C.P.N., Paul de Groot, visited Russia in 1935 and 1946; the Secretary, Johannes Pieter Schalker, visited Russia before 1940, and the second Secretary, Jan Halken, travelled through the Soviet Zone of Germany in 1947 and attended the S.E.D. Congress in Berlin. Paul de Groot attended the Communist Party Congress in England in 1947 and Jan Halken the French Communist Congress in the same year. Dockers' delegates from Rotterdam and Antwerp met in Belgium in October 1947 to discuss the means of defeating a secret agreement reached between the shipping companies in these two ports for unloading ships in one port in the event of the others being paralysed by a strike. (The only serious strikes in the Netherlands since the war have involved dockers.)

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14. The dock workers might prove troublesome in case of a conflict with Russia. Isolated acts of sabotage might also occur.

#### GRAND DUCHY OF LUXEMBOURG

1. The Communist Party is legal.
2. There is no information regarding its actual membership.
3. See 2 above. (The total population on 31st December, 1947, was 286,786, with some 4,000 persons still out of the country owing to the war.)
4. Total of electorate unknown. (In any case, election figures in Luxembourg are very misleading owing to the system of plural voting, as well as proportional representation, employed, which often gives the various parties a poll appreciably in excess of the country's population. As an additional complication, half the Chamber is elected every three years.)
5. There are five Communist members in the Chamber (none before the war) out of fifty-one, or 9.8 per cent. (The last *General Election* was held in October 1945, when, for the first time, Communists were elected. A *partial* election, affecting the southern half of the country, took place in June 1948, when four of the five Communist seats were contested; but there was no change.)
6. There was a Communist Minister of Health in the first post-war Cabinet (of "National Union"). He died in office, and was replaced by another Communist, who held the portfolio until the Cabinet's fall in March 1947, since when there have been no Communist appointments.
7. No information regarding Communist votes: *cf.* 4 above. But, in the partial election already mentioned (June 1948), the Party is known to have lost about 15 per cent. of its votes to the Socialists.

8-10. No information has been received regarding Communist influence in the Armed Forces, the police or the Civil Service.

11. At the beginning of 1945 Socialists and Communists separated to form independent unions. Communist membership was then about 16,000, Socialist about 5,500. By the end of 1948, however, Socialist membership had risen to about 12,000 (exclusive of railwaymen), while Communist membership had fallen to about 10,000—perhaps lower. If railwaymen be added (these, in the case of Communists, are represented by a small number of "fellow-travellers"), the grand totals are: Socialists, 18,000; Communists, 10,350. The steel industry, the most important in Luxembourg, has, of course, the largest membership—10,000 Socialists and 8,500 Communists. The Cabinet's policy of pegging wages is a particular grievance with railwaymen, whose almost exclusively Socialist Union

has apparently forbidden strike action. Although this has been a disappointment to the Communists, they are making every effort to foment unrest among railwaymen, and are devoting one page a week of their paper, *D'Zeitung*, in attempts to convince railwaymen that their interests are being mishandled by the Socialists.

12. Although there is no definite proof of contacts with the Soviet Union, it is strongly suspected that the Party is receiving financial aid through the medium of the Soviet Embassies in Paris and Brussels, without which the Party organ, *D'Zeitung*, would have been unable to continue to appear. As it is, *D'Zeitung* has recently been conducting a door-to-door canvass for subscriptions. Lists are prepared, which are presented to shopkeepers, café proprietors and others, who are invited either to subscribe or to take out an insurance for the future. Waverers are told, in veiled terms, that the time might come when they might have reason to regret their refusal to subscribe. It is reported that this threat has proved moderately successful. (Subscription to *D'Zeitung* is a condition of actual Party membership.)

13.-14. No information is available regarding contacts with Communists in neighbouring countries, or of the possibility of a nucleus being formed for fifth column activities.

## SPAIN

In Spain the Communist Party is an illegal and clandestine body, existing precariously under the ever watchful eye of the Franco police. The Headquarters of the Party is in France, where its Executive Committee (under the Secretary-General, Dolores Ibarruri) works in close touch with the French Communist Party and through the latter has contact with the Russian Central Communist Party.

There have, of course, been no free parliamentary elections since the civil war. Before the advent of the Republic in 1931 the Communist Party was insignificant and was not represented in the Cortes. Indeed, the first and second Parliaments of the Republic—1931 and 1933—each contained only one Communist Deputy (not the same person); and it was not until the Popular Front Government in 1936 that the Communist Party, by previous arrangement between the parties, was allotted sixteen seats.

At the time of the Popular Front Government it was estimated that there were in Spain about 50,000 Communists. The number was probably much larger by the end of the civil war. His Majesty's Ambassador in Madrid reported on 7th January, 1947, that the estimated number of Communists at that time was again 50,000. He reported, also, that there were definite signs that the Party was gaining ground in Andalusia, Extremadura and the south of Spain generally (agricultural areas), though this was not so in other regions, where the Communist Party could count only on a small minority of the workers. A more recent report, dated May 1948, confirmed that the strength of the Communist Party in the two industrial areas, the Basque Provinces and Catalonia, was in the first case negligible and in the second not much stronger.

It seems fairly certain, however, that individual Communists have infiltrated into the ranks of the clandestine political organisations such as the U.G.T. (the Socialist trade union) and the C.N.T. (the Anarchist trade union). The Communists have also made a definite attempt to secure control of the guerrillas, to unify them and to use them as Communist shock troops. The guerrillas have three main centres, in southern, central and north-west Spain, which receive guidance from Toulouse, where many of the leaders have received preliminary training in sabotage, &c., before infiltrating into Spain. Despite intensive efforts to recruit more guerrillas, however, the numbers and activities of the latter have decreased, and clandestine Communist propaganda is no more than intermittent as a result of effective police action. Judging from the scope and appeal of its propaganda and the acts of terrorism which it perpetrates—and there is at present no other mode of assessment—the potential effectiveness of the present Communist force as a fifth column would not be so great as to constitute a serious menace, whilst the present régime continues, though its nuisance value could, if necessary, be considerably expanded.



## PORTUGAL

There is in Portugal a small, well-organised and disciplined Communist Party of some 250 to 500 members. It is an illegal and clandestine party, operating under extreme difficulty. Its original founder, José de Souza, was sent to Tarrafal penal settlement in the Cape Verde Islands many years ago and released under the 1945 amnesty, returning to Portugal. (He is reported to have become disillusioned with the Party.) Dr. Alvaro Cunhal, one of the present leaders, was reported to have recently paid a visit to Moscow. The Party is thought to have affiliations with the Brazilian organisation, the *Movimento Unificador dos Trabalhadores*, which in turn is said to be subsidised from Russia. The Portuguese police attributed the rather un-Portuguese efficiency in the direction of the strikes in the Lisbon dockyards in April 1947 to foreign influence.

There has been evidence of Government disquiet at the underground activities of the Communist Party. A communiqué issued on 24th April, 1948, alleged Communist penetration of the anti-Government parties grouped in the M.U.D. (Movement of Democratic Unity), a respectable organisation grouping elements in opposition to Dr. Salazar's Government. The names of some 47 persons were given who were said to have confessed to belonging both to the M.U.D. and the Communist Party. Many of the liberal elements in M.U.D. were shocked by the revelation and left the organisation. In August some 107 persons were tried on a charge of subversive activities on behalf of the Communist Party; 39 were acquitted and the rest sentenced to varying terms of imprisonment. The Prosecution appealed against the sentences, but no record of any subsequent development has been seen.

## ITALY

1. There is a legal Communist Party.
2. *Membership on 15th December, 1947* : 2,330,887.\*
3. *Percentage of the 1947 Population* : 5.
4. *Percentage of the Electorate* : 8.2.
5. *Number of Members of the Chamber of Deputies*—

Communist Party : 132, 23 per cent.

Pro-Communist Socialist : Up to 48.

*Number of Members of the Senate* : 66, 19 per cent.

6. *Members in the National Government* : None.

7. *Votes recorded in the National Elections of 18th April 1948* : 5.9 million† approximately.

8. *Influence in the Armed Forces*.—Since the expulsion of the Extreme Left from the Government, the latter has attempted to purge its influence from the Armed Forces (including Carabinieri) and the General Staff is now confident this purge has been sufficiently well carried out to ensure against disloyalty in an emergency. Conditions of service are being improved. The P.C.I. is, nevertheless, still on the watch for opportunities to penetrate and disrupt the loyalty of the Armed Forces, in particular by attacks on the officer class and certain senior officers, and by agitation through the C.G.I.L. designed to create dissatisfaction with conditions of service, pensions, &c.

9. *Influence in the Police*.—A similar purge has been carried out in the *Pubblica Sicurezza*, involving not less than 13,000 out of a total of 70,000; its loyalty is also considered sound. Certain categories of local police are dependent on municipal administrations, which in some cases are under Communist domination, but they are not trained or equipped to suppress public disorders.

\* 2,330,887 was the number of membership cards announced at the Party Congress, Milan, January 1948. An independent source gave the number as only 1,200,000.

† The exact number of votes received by the Communist Party is not known. Votes received by the Popular Front (Communists and Nenni Socialists together) were 8,025,990. Of Popular Front seats in the Chamber, 132 are held by Communists: the votes have been divided in the same proportion as the seats.

10. *Influence in the Civil Service.*—Communists introduced into Government offices while the Communist Party was in the Government have largely been removed, and though an appreciable number still remain, Communists' attempts during October to exploit by strike action the lower Civil Service's legitimate economic grievances had little success. Pronouncements by leading Party members suggest, however, that the Civil Service is considered an important objective for Communist penetration, and that attempts to foment discontent will not be abandoned. The strike of Government employees on 20th December was only partially carried out in spite of a genuine economic grievance.

11. *Influence in the Trade Unions.*—The Communists dominate the Italian General Confederation of Labour, more particularly since the secession of the Christian Democrat Trade Union leaders in July 1948. The Socialists of both tendencies, and the Republicans, remain within the C.G.I.L. and exercise a moderating influence. The Mechanical Engineering Confederation is Communist-controlled, and is more disciplined than the Confederation of Agricultural Workers, which is also controlled by the Communists. The Italian Free General Confederation of Workers (L.C.G.I.L.) initiated in September 1948 is anti-Communist, and although open to all parties and beliefs, is mainly supported by Christian Democrats. Its strength has still to be assessed, but appears to be growing. Apart from the Mechanical Engineering Federation, the workers in Italy are not well disciplined in Trade Union matters, and are as susceptible to economic and fear motives as to political issues.

12. *Contacts between P.C.I. and Soviet Union.*—Regular conferences between P.C.I. leaders and Soviet Embassy officials do not appear to be held, nor, so far as is known, do Embassy officials give direct instructions to the P.C.I. On the other hand it is reported that instructions to the P.C.I. from the Russian Communist Party are transmitted via the Soviet Embassy, from where they are normally collected by Togliatti's personal private secretary. Visits of P.C.I. leaders to the Soviet Embassy are reported to be few, though Togliatti's wife and Giuliano Pajetta are said to be fairly frequent callers. Contacts between Togliatti himself and Soviet officials in Italy are reported to be infrequent, in contrast to the practice up to about 1946. The Soviet Ambassador was reported to have held conferences with Togliatti in Party Headquarters before and after the April elections. No visits of leading Italian Communists to Moscow have come to light, though Nenni (P.S.I.) was there on a short visit in the autumn. During the spring and summer Giuliano Pajetta in Belgrade, Reale in Warsaw, and Togliatti and Secchia in Roumania, had contact with Russian Communist officials in connection with Cominform business.

13. *Known Contacts with Communist Parties elsewhere.*—At the meetings referred to in the last sentence of paragraph 12 above contacts were undoubtedly made with some, and in the case of the meeting in Roumania, all the Communist Parties adhering to the Cominform (excepting, in the last case, the Yugoslav Communist Party). An unconfirmed report states that Di Vittorio, the Trade Union leader, conferred with leading French Communists in Paris in the autumn: a more reliable report states that a representative of the French C.G.T. is holding regular conferences in Rome with P.C.I. leaders on the co-ordination of French and Italian Communist policy with regard to strikes and agitations. Reale is also reported to have attended a meeting of the French Communist Party's International Policy Committee in Paris in April. The P.C.I. also sent delegates to the Congresses of the Belgian and Swedish Communist Parties in May, Spano going to Brussels and Donini to Stockholm. It is reported independently that relations between representatives of satellite Communist Parties in Italy and the P.C.I. have been growing closer since the formation of the Cominform (though relations between satellite diplomatic missions as such are said to be discouraged by the Russians). It is reliably reported that at the beginning of 1948 direct contact was started between the Polish Embassy and the P.C.I.: the P.C.I. is said to have provided the Embassy with good information on Italian industry, and to assist with propaganda among Polish D.P.s. In January 1949, M. Cachin, the French Communist leader, visited and spoke in various Italian towns emphasising the U.S.S.R.'s policy of peace and collaboration.

14. *Fifth-Column Potentialities.*—These are very difficult to assess in a country where the holding of a Communist Party membership card does not



necessarily imply strong Party convictions. At the broadest the Communists can count on perhaps 6 million votes, but only one-third, and perhaps even less, are members of the Party. Of these in turn only a comparatively small proportion can be trained and prepared in an emergency to commit themselves beyond compromise to real insurrectional action, and the strength of this group would depend on a large number of imponderables, *e.g.*, promptness of Government action, direct foreign military support, &c. On any calculation it is clear, however, that without being able to put an organised force into the field, the Communists could nevertheless cause serious trouble from the purely military point of view, and through the Trades Unions which they control hamstringing the country's war effort by strikes and sabotage. Small arms are available in great quantities, but it is unlikely that the Communists could, in fact, mobilise as many as the 245,000 men with rifles and a high proportion of automatics, &c., which was the Italian General Staff's estimate of Communist strength at the time of the elections. These potential fighting groups consist largely of ex-partisans, who, despite the Government's measures of last February against para-military bodies, have retained their local cadres, and organisation. At the time of the elections the Foreign Office estimated that the number which could be raised at short notice as a military formation would not exceed 40,000. There has been no later information either to support or refute this figure. The Government has had some success in bringing to light Communist store of arms. It is reported that the Party Directorate has agreed on the need to reorganise its underground Military Forces and to entrust this reorganisation to Signor Longo, the leader of the nationalistic and hotheaded elements in the Party.

15. *The Present Situation.*—The Communist Party received a serious setback in the National Elections in April from which it hopes to recover by intensifying the political education of its weaker members and strengthening leadership of local Communist organisations rather than by "purging" them to make a small and more reliable body. In the face of the increased strength of the forces of law and order the Party is unlikely to attempt to seize power by violence, except as part of a broader scheme involving perhaps an invasion of the north-east frontier, though the events following the attempt on Togliatti's life showed that the Government's margin of safety was less than had been thought. It is probable that the P.C.I. will (as it has been at pains to convince public opinion) work to broaden its grip on the country and strengthen its parliamentary position by constitutional means, *i.e.*, through alliances with other anti-Government elements and through constant labour agitation. The latter, however, will probably be designed to strike a balance between the demands of the Cominform for co-ordinated labour agitation to wreck E.R.P. and the risk of alienating popular sympathy by causing undue distress among a working-class ill-equipped to sustain lengthy strike periods (as occurred last winter). During the last two months of 1948 there were a number of strikes including that of Government employees on 20th December, but emphasis has been rather on what the Italians call non-co-operation, *i.e.*, *ca'canny* methods. The first results of this Communist policy should be seen in the communal elections scheduled for Spring 1949. Since the demise of the Popular Front, Communist propaganda has emphasised the P.C.I.'s willingness to co-operate with any "truly democratic" forces. The "pact of united action" with the P.S.I. has thus been kept in force, and mention has been made of a "Democratic Alliance" which, however, has not so far taken any concrete form. The Communists' present reliance on a moderate policy can naturally be reversed overnight.

## TRIESTE

The attack of the Cominform on Tito in June 1948 resulted in a new orientation of the Trieste Communist Party. Up till that time it had been pro-Slav, and although officially autonomous it was in fact a branch of the Yugoslav Communist Party. The Cominform onslaught was immediately followed by a split on national lines between the Italian Communists led by Vittorio Vidali, who adopted a policy of "unconditional solidarity with the Communist Parties which adhere to the Cominform," and the Slav Communists led by the Slovene Babić, who was at that time secretary of the Party and also Secretary of the Italo-Slav Anti-Fascist Union (U.A.I.S.). A general Congress of the Party

was called on 21st and 22nd August and a new Central Committee and Executive appointed consisting of Cominform supporters. The Vidali group is much the larger of the two and controls the daily *Il Lavoratore* and the *Sindacati Unici* in the United Kingdom/United States Zone, but was for some time hard pressed financially as Babić had control of the Party Funds. Its finances were, however, assured after a visit made by the Party leaders in October to Rome, which has now taken over the rôle of banker of Belgrade.

The Communist Party, while now itself violently nationalistic, is now constantly bringing fierce accusations of nationalism against the Slav Communists. A great deal of the time of the Party Congress in August was spent in indictments of the policy followed in Trieste by the Yugoslavs from the time when they took control of the local Communist Party and the Working Class Movement in general during the winter of 1943.

In September the new Executive of the Italo-Slav Anti-Fascist Union was selected, and former Slav members were eliminated, with the result that the Tito-Communists are almost excluded from Party activities in the United Kingdom/United States Zone. On the other hand, there has been a purge of Cominformists in the Yugoslav Zone, which caused bitter attacks in *Il Lavoratore* on the behaviour of the Tito-Communists in Istria. Vidali has classed Tito-Communists with Italian reaction and United States imperialism as the three chief enemies of the "democratic movement."

*The Trade Unions.*—The *Sindacati Unici*, the union which includes most of the workers in the heavy industries, is Cominformist. In September Ernest Radich, former President of the *Sindacati Unici*, who was forced to resign in 1946 owing to his opposition to Yugoslav political interference, was co-opted on to the Executive and by the end of the month had taken over direction. The *Camera del Lavoro*, which is pro-Italian and non-Communist, is afraid that the *Sindacati Unici* will now get the full support of the Italian Communist Party and of the Communist-dominated General Confederation of Labour (C.G.I.L.). The *Sindacati Unici* Congress of 4th and 5th December expelled its pro-Tito leaders. The Labour Office of A.M.G. has estimated that in the United States/United Kingdom Zone, which contains the great majority of organised workers, the *Sindacati Unici* has about 30,000–35,000 members, the *Camera del Lavoro* about 60,000.

## GREECE

*K.K.E. Strength.*—The Greek Communist Party (K.K.E.—Kommounistikon Komma Ellados) was founded in 1920, was suppressed but thrived underground during the Metaxas dictatorship (1936–41), and took a leading part in the resistance movement during the occupation. It has tried to overthrow the Greek Government since the liberation, and was outlawed by the Government in December 1947. Its youth organisation (E.P.O.N.—Eniaia Panelladike Organosis Neon) was dissolved by court order in February 1947, when strength was estimated at 185,000, excluding those fighting in the mountains. It is reported that E.P.O.N. has reappeared (clandestinely) under the title *Eamike Panellenike Organosis Neolaia*s, but no figures of its membership are available. The strength of K.K.E. as a whole cannot be calculated, although detailed statistics are available of individual cells and satellite organisations; but it is estimated (January 1949) that between 25,000 and 28,000 rebels are fighting against the Greek Army in the mountains. Of these some 7,000 are regarded by the Communist Party as "reliable."

*Communists in Government.*—There are no Communists in the Greek Government as there are none in the Chamber of Deputies. At the last General Election (March 1946) the Left-wing parties abstained from voting, but an analysis made by the Allied Mission which observed the elections gives some indication of the potential Communist vote. The mission reported that, of 40 per cent. of the electorate who did not vote, 25 per cent. abstained because of "sickness, physical incapacity, indifference, or similar causes which seemed to have no relation to any political policy," and only some 15 per cent. (280,000 persons) abstained for "party" reasons. Again, not all of these were Communists. The 280,000 abstainers also included the E.L.D. coalition (the Union of Leftist Democrats), a small group of former Liberals, and three or four smaller groups of the Left Centre.



In the mountainous parts of Greece controlled by the rebels, the Communists in December 1947 set up a "Provisional Democratic Government of Free Greece" under the premiership of "General Markos" (Markos Vafiades). This Junta was not recognised by any Government but it was welcomed by Communists everywhere and representatives were sent to Yugoslavia and Bulgaria. In the "Free Government's" territory a form of local government and legislature were set up, and local "elections" held.

*Communist Penetration.*—It is difficult to assess the degree of Communist penetration of the services, the police, the civil service, the trade unions or the non-Communist political parties, but estimates can be attempted as follows:—

(a) *The Armed Forces and Police*

The Communist Organisation of the Army and Security Corps (K.O.S.S.A.—Kommounistike Organosis Stratou Somaton Asfaleias) was formed in February 1945. Its aims are: to incite disobedience and riots in the armed forces; to collect intelligence on such subjects as order of battle of Government forces, military intentions, defence works, officers' personal records and intelligence obtained by Greek Government; to encourage desertion to the Rebel Army. It is virtually impossible to obtain reliable figures of K.O.S.S.A.'s strength but, at the end of November 1948, Communist sources estimated it at 3,285 (1½ per cent. of the total strength of the Greek armed forces).

(b) *Civil Service*

In March 1947 K.K.E. records showed 11,250 Communists in Government departments and 315 in nationalist organisations of civil servants. At that time it was estimated that 7 per cent. of K.K.E. were civil servants; certainly one of the 16 K.K.E. sections in Athens was formed entirely of civil servants. Since December 1947, however, it has been impossible for any avowed Communist to hold any civil service post and most of them have been dismissed; but it is impossible to guess how many crypto-Communists remain.

(c) *Trade Unions*

The Workers' Anti-Fascist League (E.R.G.A.S.—Ergatikos Antifasistikos Syndesmos) is the workers' association through which the Communists hope to penetrate the Greek trade unions. In March 1946 E.R.G.A.S. managed to secure five seats on the Executive of the Greek Confederation of Labour as against four for its combined opponents, but in July their election was declared invalid and a provisional executive was appointed to act until fresh elections could be held at a congress in March 1948. From this Congress a predominantly right-wing executive emerged and it seems that E.R.G.A.S.'s influence in the trade unions is decreasing; but their numbers are unknown.

(d) *Non-Communist Political Parties*

Estimates of Communist penetration of the other political parties are attempted from time to time, but no reliable figures are available.

*Known Contacts with Communists Abroad.*—Zachariades (the leader of K.K.E.) and Porfyrogenis make regular visits to Moscow and the Central European countries. Moreover, practically every capital in Europe, including London, and New York have their Committees for Aid to Democratic Greece, which send financial and material aid to the Greek Communists. In addition, United Nations observers have witnessed the logistical support given by Albania, Bulgaria and Yugoslavia to the rebels.

*Potential Fifth Column.*—It is unsafe to assume that the numbers quoted above represent a potential fifth column. Some believe that nine-tenths of the Greek rebels and their supporters are at heart Greeks first and Communists second, who would not hesitate to join the Greek Army against any foreign invader. Others, however, point out that during 1948 the hard core (say, 7,000) of the Rebel Army has established a much greater *esprit de corps* than the rebels have had before and believe that these 7,000 would follow their present leaders, whatever they did, if there were a Slav invasion.

## DENMARK

1. Danmarks Kommunistiske Parti.
2. About 28,000.
3. Less than 1 per cent. (0·7 per cent.).
4. Party membership constituted 1·1 per cent. of the 1947 electorate.
5. It holds 9 seats of a total of 148, representing 6·1 per cent.
6. There are no Communists in the National Government.
7. It recorded 141,094 votes in the elections to the Folketing in 1947. The figure represented 6·8 per cent. of the poll.
8. Its influence is very small in the actual Services, but somewhat greater in the Home Guard. Lately the Communists have lost ground also in the Home Guard, and the vast majority of the Force is fully reliable.
9. It is slight.
10. Its influence is very small. There is no known organised penetration of Government Departments or Civil Service organisations.
11. Within the trade union movement as a whole Communist influence is not great. They are, however, fairly strong in certain unions in Copenhagen and have shown themselves capable of fomenting and sustaining unofficial strikes in opposition to the trade union leadership.
12. No regular open contact is maintained. Communist leaders pay occasional visits to the Soviet Union and satellite countries.
13. Danish Communist leaders frequently meet their Swedish and Norwegian opposite numbers. Contact with Sweden appears to be more frequent than with Norway (*vide* also under Finland).
14. As a fifth-column, its potentialities are probably not very great, but many Communists gained experience of underground work during the occupation. A considerable quantity of arms is still at large in the country, and of these a substantial proportion may well be in Communist hands.

## NORWAY

1. Norges Kommunistiske parti.
2. 17,600 (in February, 1949).
3. About 0·6 per cent.
4. About 0·8 per cent.
5. It holds 11 seats out of 150, representing 7·3 per cent.
6. There are no Communists in the National Government.
- 7.—(a) It recorded 167,704 votes in the *Storting* elections of 1945. The Communist vote represented 11 per cent. of the total poll.  
(b) It recorded 143,205 votes in the local elections held in November 1947. This represented 10·4 per cent. of all votes, as the poll was smaller than in the *Storting* elections.
8. Its influence in the armed forces is negligible.
9. Its influence in the police is very small.
10. Its influence in the Civil Service is very small. There is no known organised penetration of Government Departments or Civil Service Organisations.
11. Its influence in the trade union movement is small. Communists control only about one-seventh of the Representative Council of Trade Union Confederation and no district Trades Council. Nevertheless, the Party has shown itself able to foment local unofficial strikes in important industries. The Communists must be expected to make a special effort among the seamen.



12. There is no regular open contact with the Soviet Union. Communist leaders pay occasional visits to that country and satellite States.

13. Periodical meetings with Swedish and Danish Communists are held. Finnish Communists frequently also participate (*vide* also under Finland).

14. Norwegian Communists gained considerable experience of underground work during the occupation, but it is doubtful whether even any great number of Party members would be prepared to fight against their own countrymen. Communist fifth-column activity is likely to be strongest in northern Norway, but the Party's potentialities are probably lower than those of the Danish and Swedish sister parties.

## SWEDEN

1. Sveriges Kommunistiska parti.

2. About 50,000.

3. Less than 1 per cent. (about 0.9 per cent.).

4. About 1.2 per cent.

5. In the indirectly elected First Chamber of 150 members the Communists hold 3 seats, representing 2 per cent. In the directly elected Second Chamber the Communists hold 8 seats out of a total of 230. This represents less than 3.5 per cent. The Communist percentage of the Riksdag as a whole is below 2.9.

6. There are no Communists in the National Government.

7. It recorded 244,812 votes representing 6.31 per cent. of the total poll 3,879,098 in the General Election held on 19th September, 1948. Despite an increase of 792,794 votes over the total poll of 1944, the Communist Party received 73,654 fewer votes than in that year.

8. Its influence in the armed forces is negligible. The military authorities, moreover, keep a close watch on known Communists during their conscript service.

9. Its influence in the police is very small. In Stockholm a Communist, Set Persson, presides over the Police Committee of the City Council, but that body does not exercise control over police activities.

10. In the Civil Service the Party's influence is also very small. A certain number of Communists must be assumed to have entered the Civil Service, but there are no indications of organised penetration in any Government Department or in Civil Service organisations.

11. The Communists are strong in certain trade unions, notably in the branches of the Metal Workers' Union, and their influence is disproportionately large to their numbers. Nevertheless they only constitute a small, though well organised minority. During recent months their importance has further decreased.

12. There is no overt regular contact with the Soviet Union. Communist leaders pay occasional visits to that country and to Soviet satellite countries.

13. Frequent meetings take place between Scandinavian Communist leaders. Representatives of the Finnish Communist Party are also often present. The existence of a Scandinavian Communist Bureau has been rumoured. It is said that it formerly had its location in Oslo but that it was moved to Gothenburg during the spring of 1948. The police in that city have been unable to confirm these reports (*vide* also under Finland).

14. Its potentialities as a fifth-column should not be over-rated. The vast majority of party members would probably shrink from taking an active part against their own country in case of war. The Communist leaders would almost certainly be rounded up by the police very rapidly, but a certain amount of sabotage might be expected, in all probability directed chiefly against communications, power installations and shipyards.

## FINLAND

1. Suomen Kommunistinen Puolue (S.K.P.).
2. About 35,000.
3. Less than 1 per cent (about 0.9 per cent.).
4. About 1.3 per cent.
5. The Communist Party holds 33 seats out of a total of 200, representing 16.5 per cent. To this, however, must be added 5 seats held by fellow travellers who have joined with the Communists in the Finnish People's Democratic Union (S.K.D.L.). The S.K.D.L. invariably votes and acts as a single body. Its 38 members, accordingly, constitute 19 per cent. of Parliament, and it is this figure which should be regarded as effective Communist strength.
6. There are no Communists in the National Government.
7. It polled about 360,000 votes out of a total poll of 1,772,505 in the General Election held in July 1948. This represents 20.3 per cent. The figures are in respect of the votes recorded on the joint lists of the S.K.D.L.
8. Its influence is not very great. Most officers have fought against the Soviet Union and regard Communism with implacable hostility.
9. In December 1948 the Communist-penetrated Secret State Police (V.A.L.P.O.) was disbanded by the Government. Its officers were either dismissed or placed in employment where they are comparatively harmless. The District Forces are not penetrated and the Police, as a whole, is completely loyal to the President and the Government.
10. Some penetration, albeit on a minor scale, has been effected in the Ministries of Supply and Education. Communists hold important posts on the School Board and in the administration of the State Broadcasting Corporation. The Government is aware of this latter danger and has already taken steps to curb their activities.
11. This is fairly considerable. Roughly, two-fifths of the Council of the Central Federation of Trade Unions (S.A.K.) is Communist-controlled. The Communists dominate ten out of thirty-eight affiliated unions, including the important unions of transport workers, timber workers and forestry and floating workers. They have a considerable nuisance value in the movement, but, despite several attempts, have shown themselves unable to cause a general strike.
12. Mme. Hertta Kuusinen-Leino, the Communist leader, as a dutiful daughter, often visits her father, Otto Kuusinen, of Terijoki notoriety, who occupies an important position in the Kremlin hierarchy. She may well be the main link between the Soviet Union and the Communist Parties in Finland and the Scandinavian countries. The Finnish Minister in Moscow is a near Communist.
13. Mme. Hertta Kuusinen-Leino frequently visits Stockholm and Oslo (*vide* 12 above).
14. In view of Finland's exposed position the fifth-column danger must be rated highly. Owing to the strong resistance of the remainder of the population it is, nevertheless, unlikely that the Finnish Communists would be able to carry out a *coup* on the Czech model without full and open Soviet intervention.

## ICELAND

1. The "Sócialistaflokkur" (commonly called the Communist Party).
2. No accurate assessment is available, but it is probably not less than 4,000.
3. Based on the above figure, about 3 per cent.
4. Based on the above figure, over 5 per cent.
5. It holds 10 seats of a total of 52, representing over 19 per cent.
6. There are no Communists in the National Government.



7. In the general election in 1946 the Communists received 13,000 votes or about 20 per cent. of the total poll.
8. Iceland has no armed forces.
9. Exact details of penetration of the police are not known, but the influence is probably moderate.
10. In all probability its influence in the Civil Service is again only moderate.
11. In the trade unions, however, its influence is very considerable. Up till the autumn of 1948 the Communists held an absolute majority in the Central Federation of Trade Unions. They have now lost that majority but still constitute the largest single party. They also control numerous trade union branches at various centres, the most important of these being the Reykjavik Labourers' Union.
12. Regular contact with the Soviet Union is not openly maintained, but, nevertheless, liaison certainly exists. Certain Icelandic Communists are employed in the Soviet Legation, and the Legation has taken an active part in circumventing currency and import restrictions in order to supply the Communists with literature.
13. Icelandic fraternal delegates have attended Communist conferences in Scandinavia, but contact appears to be less frequent than between the parties of the other Scandinavian countries.
14. Its fifth-column potentialities are probably fairly great. Strikes and underground propaganda could probably be conducted on an extensive scale, and were the Communists to obtain arms they would constitute a very grave danger in view of the absence of any armed forces at the disposal of the Government. The Communist leaders certainly possess the organisational abilities to engineer a *coup*.

## ARGENTINA

1. The Communist Party was legalised in October 1945 after fifteen years of repression.
2. Its membership is not known, but estimated at 53,000.
3. The Communist vote is of the order of  $\frac{1}{2}$  per cent. of the population.
4. In March 1948 the vote was under  $2\frac{1}{2}$  per cent. of the electorate.
- 5-6. There are no Communist Deputies or Senators in Congress, or Ministers.
7. In March 1948 the Communist poll was about 84,000 out of 2,313,000 votes cast. Of this total 45,100 votes came from the Federal Capital, where the Communist proportion reached  $7\frac{1}{2}$  per cent. In Mendoza the Communists took 7,250 out of 98,000 votes and won three places in the provincial legislature.
- 8-10. The army is probably quite clear of communism, and so is the police. There is no evidence of penetration in the civil service.
11. Although the greater part of the trade union movement is harnessed to President Perón's Secretariat of Labour, there is considerable and increasing Communist activity. Trades in which this is strongest are the building industry, petroleum, metallurgy, textiles, market-gardening and the frigoríficos.
12. Argentine Communist intellectuals have visited Europe. The Slav immigrants in Argentina are organised into a Slav Union, said to number 270,000, which is closely connected with the Soviet Embassy and is believed also to be in contact with the Argentine Communists.
13. Buenos Aires is said to have become the centre for South America.
14. While the Argentine Communist Party appears to be in no condition to defy the Argentine authorities or even the Perónista organisation, it is possible that any general disillusionment with Perónism might swell the Communist ranks. From the British point of view the main danger is to the meat supply.

## BOLIVIA

1. There is no purely Communist Party. A so-called Communist Party formed in 1946 was a Government-sponsored device for splitting the Opposition. The Left-wing Revolutionary Party (P.I.R.) is a Marxist party whose leader Dr. Arce is probably a Communist. It was heavily diluted with non-Communists, many of whom appear to have separated themselves from it because of Dr. Arce's attitude to Russia.

2. P.I.R. was estimated in 1946 to have 15,000 members and 10,000 active sympathisers.

3. This is an insignificant proportion of the total population (estimated  $3\frac{3}{4}$  million).

4. The population of genuine Communists in P.I.R. is difficult to ascertain; in January 1947 P.I.R. probably accounted for a third of the votes cast, or a quarter of the electorate.

5. In March 1947 P.I.R. had six Senators out of twenty-seven, and thirty-nine Deputies out of 111. The proportion of Communists is difficult to ascertain.

6. A member of P.I.R. was in the Cabinet for a short while.

7. There is no pure Communist vote. The most recent index is the vote of 13,900 out of 72,000 cast in La Paz in December 1947 (for the People's Party).

8. The army is probably free of Communists.

9-10. Insufficient information.

11. There has been considerable labour unrest in Bolivia, and the P.I.R. have certainly encouraged some of the strikes. Their preponderance in the mining areas has been rather shaken by the revival of the "Fascist" M.N.R. The miner's leader Lechin, a free-lance, might embrace communism if it were to his interest.

12-13. Dr. Arce visited Europe in 1947, and was seen with Soviet officials. He is, or was, in contact with Chilean and Peruvian Communists.

14. The principal danger in Bolivia is to the supply of tin.

## BRAZIL

1. The Brazilian Communist Party (P.C.B.) was declared illegal in 1935, went underground, was legalised in 1945, and became illegal again in May 1947.

2. Its leader boasted it rose from 4,000 members in 1945 to 130,000 in 1946; other estimates halve the latter figure.

3. The total population is 46 million.

4. The electorate is about 7 million.

5. In 1945 the Communist Party had 16 seats in the Lower House out of 216; and one Senator out of 63; a second seat in the Senate was won in 1947. The mandates were annulled in January 1948; but two Communists continued to sit as Socialists.

6. It has never held any offices.

7. In 1945 it received 500,000 votes, or 7 per cent. of the electorate. It failed to improve on these figures in 1947. Its local strength is in the Federal District (where it held about a third of the seats on the Municipal Council), Pernambuco and Sao Paulo.

8-10. At one time it had cells in the army and civil service; steps have been taken to eradicate them, but it cannot be said whether they have been effective.

11. Communists influence in the trade unions was formerly great. The Government now controls the unions through the Ministry of Labour.

12. Luis Carlos Prestes (among others) has visited the U.S.S.R.



13. Since May 1947 he is reported to have taken refuge in Uruguay; contact with other Latin American Communists appears to have been regularly through Uruguay.

14. In case of emergency, the Brazilian Communists could possibly be very troublesome: in 1948 there were several reports of sabotage which may not have been without foundation. There have been reports of a split among Brazilian Communists since May 1947, and it is difficult to tell how far their organisation has survived this.

## CENTRAL AMERICA

1. Communism was legal in Costa Rica till 1948, when the "Popular Vanguard" chose the losing side in the civil war. In El Salvador, Honduras and Nicaragua, it is illegal. In Guatemala no organised Communist Party is known to exist, though there are fellow-travellers in the present Left-wing régime, and there is non-indigenous labour agitation.

2-4. In Costa Rica the Popular Vanguard contained Socialists and Communists, but was led by a Communist. The number of Communists is unascertainable.

5-6. In Costa Rica the Popular Vanguard had six Deputies out of fifty-six before the civil war.

7. In Costa Rica the Vanguard had 8,000 votes out of 100,000 cast in 1946, but candidates were not presented in all parts of the country.

8-10. Information insufficient: it may be assumed that the armies are clear, except perhaps in Guatemala.

11. The trade unions are susceptible to Communist influence but it is doubtful if penetration has gone far except in Guatemala and Costa Rica.

12. A Guatemalan fellow-traveller was for some time minister in Moscow.

13. Contact is generally through Mexico.

14. The Central American Communists have little significance as a fifth column: they are perhaps most dangerous in Guatemala.

## CHILE

1. The Communist Party was legalised in 1938 when it joined the Popular Front. It was made illegal again in July 1948, though its Deputies and Senators retained their seats.

2. Its membership is not known: see question 7. Communist sympathisers have been estimated at 200,000. Names struck off the voting registers under the "Defence of Democracy" Law number 20,000.

3. The voting strength was 1 per cent. of the population in March 1948.

4. Voting strength was nearly 12 per cent. of the electorate in March 1948.

5. The Chilean Communist Party had 16 Deputies out of 147 and 5 Senators out of 46.

6. It was given three seats in the Cabinet as a result of the electoral support it gave to President González Videla in 1946: the portfolios were lost in March 1947. The Chilean is the only Latin American Communist Party to have attained office.

7. The last record of its voting strength was 80,000 in March 1948.

8-10. Before its prohibition the Chilean Communist Party had cells in the army, among teachers and in the public service. Efforts to decontaminate the army have probably been successful, and anti-Communist measures have been applied throughout the public service.

11. The main Communist strength lay in the unions, where the Party exercised an influence disproportionate to its numerical strength. Strenuous attempts have been made to break the authority of the Communist leaders by "relegating" them away from their own districts, but the Party probably retains a subterranean hold on the miners and nitrate-workers.

12. A number of intellectuals have visited Europe.

13. Contacts exist through Uruguay and Mexico: the Party fostered Communism in Peru and Bolivia.

14. Under the emergency laws the Government has the situation well in hand, but the Chilean Communist Party has deep roots and can find plenty of opportunity among a "politically conscious" working-class existing in unsatisfactory social conditions. From a strategic point of view the main danger is the sabotage of copper and nitrate production.

## COLOMBIA

1. There was a legal Communist Party ("The Social Democratic Party") which split into three parts in 1946-47: there is also Communist infiltration in the Left-wing of the Liberal Party.

2. The Social Democratic Party had 12,000 members.

3. This is an insignificant proportion of the total population.

4. In 1947 the Communist vote fell to 1 per cent. of the electorate.

5. The Communists had formerly 5 seats in Congress, which were all lost in 1947: they have only one seat in the departmental assemblies. They had formerly about 38 seats on municipal bodies.

6. There are no Communist Ministers.

7. In 1944 the Communists had 30,000 votes: this dropped to 12,500 in 1947.

8-9. The army and police are probably now clear.

10. There has been some penetration in the Ministries of Communications and Public Works.

11. Communists are preponderant in the Colombian Labour Federation, which is by far the largest body of organised workers in Colombia.

12. Insufficient information: contact with Russia appears to be through Mexico.

13. There is close contact with Mexico and Havana.

14. The Communists could do serious damage in the oilfields.

## CUBA

1. The Communist Party has legal rights.

2. The membership of the Cuban Communist Party is said to be about 150,000.

3. This corresponds to 3 per cent. of the total population.

4. And to about  $7\frac{1}{2}$  per cent. of the electorate.

5. It has 9 Deputies out of 118, and no Senators.

6. It has no members in the Government.

7. The Cuban Communist Party had 116,000 votes or just over 5 per cent. of the electorate in 1944 and 130,000 or  $6\frac{1}{2}$  per cent. in 1948.

8-10. Insufficient evidence, probably some penetration.

11. The Cuban trades unions are organised into the Cuban Labour Confederation (C.T.C.). This was Communist-controlled until 1947, when a split



took place, and there are now two bodies with the same name, the one Communist, and the other official. The anti-Communist C.T.C. is itself split.

12. Leaders have visited Poland and the U.S.S.R.

13. There is close contact with Mexico.

14. If Cuba lost its present prosperity, the Communists could probably cause serious difficulties.

## DOMINICAN REPUBLIC

There is no legal Communist Party, nor is there likely to be while General Trujillo is in the saddle. There are some Labour agitators, and it is probable that a number of Trujillo's political exiles have embraced Communism. But there is virtually none in the country.

## ECUADOR

1. There is a small Communist Party, which was outlawed in 1936, but now functions openly.

2. Its membership is not known: among the oil workers at Ancón there are 250 members and 200 subscribing sympathisers.

3. Unknown, but very small.

4. Unknown, but small.

5. There appear to be no Communist deputies.

6. There are no Communists in the Government.

7. Information insufficient.

8-10. Attempts to penetrate the army are reported to have failed.

11. The Ecuadorean unions are not very strong, but there is Communist activity, especially on the Coast. The Ancón oil strike of July 1948 was due to Communist workings, but only 20 per cent. of the workers were said to favour a general strike.

12. The Secretary-General, Paredos, has visited Russia.

13. Contact appears to be through Bogotá, and possibly also Mexico and Havana.

14. Attempts have been made to spread Communism in the oilfields, with partial success.

## HAITI

1. A small Communist Party was formed before the last presidential elections, but was later disbanded. Its leaders were given "scholarships" abroad.

2. Its active membership did not exceed 200.

## MEXICO

1. The Communist Party is a legal political party; Señor Lombardo Toledano's "People's Party" also contains many known Communists.

2. For this it required to register 30,000 members and 1,000 in each State; this has probably been "arranged." It had reached 17,000 members in 1938-40, but dropped to 3,000 in 1943.

3. The membership is an insignificant percentage of the total population.

4. Information insufficient.

5-6. There are no Communist Deputies or Ministers.

7. There has been no separate national Communist vote.

8-10. There appear to be cells in various walks of life, but there is no concrete evidence of the extent of penetration.

11. The main strength of the Mexican Communists lies in labour circles and in the "intellectuals." The Confederation of Mexican Labour was the point of departure for the Latin-American Confederation of Labour led by Sr. Lombardo Toledano; this is pro-Communist, as is Lombardo's "Workers' University."

12. Lombardo has several times visited Communist Europe.

13. Mexico appears to be a favourite ground for exchanges between other Latin American countries and Moscow.

14. The Communist Party as such is not very dangerous but the People's Party might in time come to disrupt the Government *bloc*.

### PANAMA

1. The Communists are not a legally recognised political party, but are not illegal. Communists vote with Socialists.

2. Membership is unknown, but estimated at 500.

3-4. Information insufficient.

5. One member of the Constituent Assembly of 1945, elected as a Socialist, was a Communist.

6. There are no Communist Ministries.

7. The Communist vote appears to be inseparable from the Socialist.

8-10. Information insufficient.

11. The Federation of Panamanian Workers is partially led by Communists, as is the United Public Workers' Union.

12. Information insufficient.

13. There is contact with Mexico.

14. A very small force could, in view of Panamá's strategic importance, do very great damage.

### PARAGUAY

1. The Communist Party was legal from August 1946 to January 1947: since fighting on the losing side in the civil war, it has been *suppressed*.

2. Its membership was estimated at 2,000 to 2,500 at the end of 1946.

3. At 2,500 less than  $\frac{1}{4}$  per cent.

4. No information.

5-6. It has had no representation.

7. No record of any voting.

8-10. Its influence in the public service is probably negligible.

11. Part of the trade union movement is probably still fundamentally Communist: the Communists controlled the Workers' Council, with perhaps 50,000 members, before the civil war of 1947.

12-13. Contacts appear to be through Uruguay.

14. At the moment, the Communist Party seems to be endeavouring to reform after its crushing defeat in the civil war. Its present situation is uncertain, but weak.

### PERU

1. The Communist Party was legal from May 1945 until November 1948, when it was proscribed.



2. Its strength was admitted to be only 9,000 in 1948, or 15,000 with sympathisers.

3. This strength is less than  $\frac{1}{4}$  per cent. of the population.

4. It represents rather less than 3 per cent. of the electorate.

5. The Communists returned one Deputy in 1939, and five in 1945, out of 127; they had no Senators, with the military revolution of October 1948 their representation was lost. Eight more Deputies and three Senators were sympathisers.

6. There has been no representation in the Government.

7. In 1945 the total Communist poll was about 30,000.

8-9. There is probably little penetration in the army or police force.

10. Information insufficient.

11. Communism in Peru, as elsewhere in Latin America, derives most of its strength from the trade unions; but of the large Socialist Party, A.P.R.A., was entirely anti-Communist. Both are now illegal.

12. No information: the founder of the Peruvian Communist Party, Mariategui (d. 1930), was trained in Europe.

13. There is contact through Chile and Mexico.

14. The suppression of both A.P.R.A. and the Communist Party may tell rather in favour of the latter. The military régime may be expected to do their best to eradicate Communism and it is unlikely that the Communists will be able to attempt overt action. Influence among the dockers at Callao has been strong and sabotage there cannot be ruled out.

## URUGUAY

1. The Communist Party is legal.

2. Its membership is unknown; but its voting strength has reached 32,600.

3. By voting strength, it is about  $1\frac{1}{2}$  per cent. of the total population.

4. Its vote was about 5 per cent. of the total electorate in 1946.

5. It has 5 seats out of 99 in the Chamber and 1 out of 30 in the Senate.

6. It has no representation in the Government.

7. In 1942 the Communists polled 14,300 votes; in 1946 32,630, an increase of 130 per cent.

8-10. Insufficient evidence.

11. The Communists dominate the trade unions.

12. The veteran leader, Sr. Gómez, visited Communist Europe in 1948.

13. There are contacts with all the neighbouring countries, with Chile and with Mexico, Uruguay is something of a centre for South American Communists.

14. The Communists are well entrenched in labour organisation, and could sabotage Uruguay's export trade.

## VENEZUELA

1. The Communist Party was legalised in October 1945.

2. Its membership is unknown; but its voting strength reached 55,000 in 1946 and fell to 45,000 in December 1947. Some Communists, however, were registered in the Democratic Action Party.

3. Voting strength in 1946 was  $1\frac{1}{2}$  per cent. of the total population.

4. In terms of the electorate, voting strength was  $4\frac{1}{2}$  per cent.

5. In 1946 the Communists had two seats in Congress out of 160; these disappeared with the military revolution of November 1948.

6. There have been no Communist Ministers.

7. The Venezuela Communist Party had 55,000 votes in 1946.

8. The army is probably clear or almost clear.

9.-10. Information insufficient.

11. The Venezuelan Communists are strongest among intellectuals and the oilfield workers.

12. The founder of the Venezuelan Party was Russian trained.

13. There is contact with Mexico.

14. The Venezuelan oilfields are of great strategic importance, and even an underground Communist movement could do vital damage.

### TURKEY

General feeling in Turkey is extremely strong against Communism. The Communist Party is illegal. The only Communist group suspected to exist is confined to a few intellectuals in large towns, who are vigorously and efficiently suppressed by the Police.

### EGYPT

1. There is no legal Communist Party, but an illegal body called the "Democratic Movement of National Liberation" (Haraket al Dimokratiya lil Tahrur al Watani) is Communist in word and deed. Another illegal Communist group, "La Ligue Juive contre le Sionisme," is closely connected with it.

2. It is impossible to make any estimate of the total strength of these groups, or to distinguish between individuals who are genuine Marxists and those who are merely self-seeking agitators of varying shades of political pink. Genuine Communists probably number not more than a few hundreds, perhaps a thousand at the very most.

3.-7. Not applicable.

8.-9. The armed forces and, perhaps, the police are Communist-penetrated to some extent. The D.M.N.L. has a police and army section, which was active in mid-1948, but there is no reliable information on the extent of its present membership. A body formed in the summer of 1948, "The Union of armed forces in the army and the police," will doubtless be used to ventilate the widespread dissatisfaction with the conditions of service which has been growing in both forces during the past year. Whether it has any Communist connexions is not known. The lowered morale of the army, caused by the Palestine campaign, may also be exploited by the Communists.

10. There is no evidence of Communism in the Civil Service. Civil Servants would be particularly careful to keep any such sympathies secret.

11. There is, as yet, little real Communism in the trade unions, but organised labour has, nevertheless, proved a receptive—perhaps the most receptive—seedbed for Communist propaganda. Several important strikes, particularly that at the Mehalla al Kubra textile factory in September-October 1947, undoubtedly had a degree of Communist inspiration behind them. Mohammed Yusuf al Mudarik, one of the Egyptian representatives to the W.F.T.U. Conference at Prague in 1946, heads a body called the "Democratic Committee for the Liberation of Labour," believed to be closely tied to the D.M.N.L. Practically nothing is known of its composition.

11A. The students, particularly those of the Cairo and Alexandria universities, have also proved a receptive field to Communist seed. The D.M.N.L. is believed to be in touch with Communist-minded students, but it must be emphasised



that in most cases these sympathisers are merely giving expression to a frothy xenophobia and cannot be described as genuine Communists.

12. The Soviet Legation in Cairo is probably in closer touch with the D.M.N.L. (and with its leader, Henri Curial) than recent reports show. Certain high-level members of the Wafd Party are known to have been in contact with the Legation. In the past the satellite missions (particularly the Yugoslavs) appear to have been mainly responsible for directing Communist activities in Egypt.

13. The Soviet Legation in Beirut is believed to be the main centre from which instructions are issued to other Middle East countries. So far, however, there is no evidence of any links between Egypt and Lebanon, or even Palestine and Israel—potentially much more likely sources of infection. The only confirmed link is with the Sudan. The D.M.N.L. is known to be in contact with the Sudanese National Liberation Movement, and is believed to have a section dealing exclusively with Sudanese elements—particularly visiting students.

14. The Egyptian masses are easily roused, and there is much smouldering discontent which could well be exploited, but at present there is no strong party or prominent leader who could gain the support of the mob, the armed forces and the civil administration. Communism in Egypt is thus unlikely to extend its influence far beyond its present limits. The Greek community in Cairo certainly contains some Communists, but they have so far kept outside the orbit of the Egyptian movement. Since the outbreak of hostilities in Palestine the police have made widespread arrests of Communist suspects (particularly Jews) with the result that the D.M.N.L. has now been stifled almost out of existence. There are reports that it is breaking up into small, separate groups.

## THE SUDAN

1. There is no legal Communist Party in the Sudan, but a body known as the "Sudanese Movement of National Liberation" has Communist tendencies.

2. The few members (all Sudanese) are mainly students from the Gordon College in Khartoum and are unimportant as individuals. There are not likely to be more than a hundred of them.

3-7. Not applicable.

8-11. The armed forces, police, civil service and trade unions all appear to be clear.

12. There are no known links between the "Movement" and any Soviet consular or diplomatic officials. The "Movement" was, however, mentioned approvingly by Moscow Radio in October 1948.

13. The "Sudanese Movement of National Liberation" is undoubtedly linked with the Egyptian D.M.N.L. During the past year several students at Egyptian universities have taken part in Communist activities, and a body in Egypt known as the "General Union of Sudanese Students" is Communist-dominated.

14. The influence of the Sudanese "Movement" is extremely limited, and likely to remain so in the foreseeable future. As a potential fifth-column, therefore, it need not yet be given serious consideration.

## ETHIOPIA

1. There is as yet no known Communist Party or group.

2-7. Not applicable.

8-11. There does not appear to be any Communist influence in the armed forces, police, or civil service. Trade union organisation is virtually non-existent.

12. Communist propaganda, some of which reaches Somalia and even the Belgian Congo, is undoubtedly disseminated from the Soviet Legation, but so far there is no evidence that this mission is directing Communist activities anywhere.

in Africa. A Soviet hospital in Addis Ababa, opened in 1947, provides a good cover for underground activities.

13. The Somali Youth League, a vociferous Nationalist organisation, was reported in December 1948 to harbour a small Communist cell. There are a few thousand members of the League in Ethiopia.

14. So far the Ethiopians have proved unresponsive to Communist propaganda, and are likely to remain so. The Greek community (which is comparatively large) presents the only fertile field for Communist seed. The Left-wing section is believed to be organised into Communist cells, and in December 1948 some forty suspects were under observation.

## PALESTINE

1. The Palestine Communist Party is recognised as a political party by the present Jewish authorities. Details of Communist Party organisations are as follows:—

### (a) Jewish

- (1) *The Palestine Communist Party (P.K.P.)*.—Early this year it was agreed that it should be regarded as a Jewish national party on conditions that it ceased to oppose the creation of a Jewish national State (which it opposed until Russia declared in favour of it) and unrestricted immigration. It thereupon adopted the new title of "The Communist Party of Eretz Israel." The leader is Shmuel Mikunis, and other prominent members are Meir Wilner, Esther Wilenska and Eliahu Goszanski.
- (2) *The Hebrew Communist Party*, led by Meir Slonim, has always favoured Jewish national Communism, in contrast to the P.K.P., which, until the Russian change of policy over Palestine, aimed at collaboration with the Arabs and the creation of a unitary State. Now that P.K.P. has adopted its policy there seems little reason for the Hebrew Communist Party's separate existence. It did not put forward a separate list of candidates for the January 1949 elections.
- (3) Reports of unknown reliability gave the formation of a "League of the Friends of Liberty" as having taken place in September, apparently under Communist auspices. Nothing further has been heard of this organisation. One Arazi, described as the head of a branch in the Ministry of Industry and Commerce, was mentioned as present at the early meeting.

### (b) Arab

*The Arab League for National Liberation (A.L.N.L.)* is the Communist organisation. Originally part of the Palestine Communist Party, it became a separate party, while retaining contacts with Jewish organisations. The breach became wider after last November, when the United Nations Assembly voted in favour of partition, but the latest reports show that the A.L.N. has changed its policy and is working closely with, and is dominated by, the P.K.P. Its leaders are Emil Thuma, Fuad Nasr and Hanna Nagana.

2. In April 1947 the P.K.P. was reported to number 3,700 full members and 1,500 voluntary contributors. Its youth movement was estimated to be 650 strong. This brings the total number of party members and subscribers at that time to about 6,000. *The Hebrew Communist Party* is estimated to have about 3,000 members. Fellow-travelling organisations, such as the V-League, the Progressive Union of Ex-Servicemen, the Pan-Slav Union, and others, are not included; sympathisers in these bodies must have increased recently owing to consistent Russian support for the Jewish State.

A.L.N.L. membership was reported to be 5,700 in April 1947. Since the United Nations partition resolution it has largely disintegrated, and its leaders have, for the most part, fled to the Levant. Reports that it was organising Arab workers under Jewish control in Nazareth, and was recognised by the Jews as a political party (August 1948) have since been confirmed (but see 1 (b) above).



3. *Jews*.—The figure of 1.5 per cent. given in the earlier edition of this report has probably been increased by subsequent immigration from Eastern Europe. No accurate figure can, at present, be suggested.

*Arabs*: Unknown.

4. 3.5 per cent. of the total votes cast.

5. It has four seats on the Jewish Constituent Assembly of 120 members elected in January 1949.

6. It had no members in the former National Government, and is unlikely to be represented in the Government now being formed.

7. In January 1949, in the elections for the Constituent Assembly, the Communist Party polled 14,999 votes.

8.—(a) *Haganah*.—This "Defence" force has now become the Israeli army. The "Palmach," its "striking force," was reported in March 1948 to be planned with an establishment of 20,000, including many Russian-speaking members who had entered Palestine illegally. Another report suggested that Communists had infiltrated into the Haganah about that time. The Palmach is under the influence of the powerful Mapam party which contains a Communist element.

(b) *The Irgun Zvai Leumi*.—This terrorist organisation was dissolved, as such, late in 1948; its place was taken, politically, by the Herut Party. Its units were absorbed into the army. As the Herut shows Communist sympathy it is to be assumed that the members of the party in the army also represent a potential Communist influence.

(c) *The Stern Gang*.—"the Fighters for the Freedom of Israel," and now a political party, which put forward candidates on a "Fighters' and Soldiers'" list, is a revolutionary party of the Right rather than Communist, though it would readily lend itself to communism if such a course appeared profitable. The extent of its influence in the armed forces is unknown.

9. The extent of Communist influence in the police is unknown.

10. The extent of Communist influence in the civil service is unknown (but see 1 (a) 3 above).

11. *Jews*.—After the fusion of the Hashomer Hatzair and the Labour Unity Party (both extreme Left parties with a "class struggle" programme) in January 1948, which, with the Poale Zion, became the Mapam, in February 1948, it was reported that 40 per cent. of the Histadruth (Jewish Trades Union Movement) were veering towards the East, but that 20 per cent. only would follow an extreme Left-wing party.

The Histadruth is a very powerful organisation, which, in the past, had a large measure of control over the Jewish Agency in Palestine. Until 1946 the Communists were excluded from the Histadruth, but in 1947 the P.K.P. gained a considerable influence in it. In August 1947 it was claimed that the "Communist Fraction" in the movement numbered 7-8,000 (out of, perhaps, 150,000). The creation of the Mapam, with its Communist leanings, must be regarded as, potentially, increasing this figure considerably.

*Arabs*.—In September 1947 the A.L.N.L. claimed to control 4,000 members, consisting of the "Progressive Trade Unions," out of a total of 18,000 members represented at the Arab Workers' Congress.

12. Contacts with the Soviet Legation in Beirut have been frequent. This is especially true of the A.L.N.L., although when representatives of the Legation visited Palestine they have contacted Jewish Communists also. There have been a few contacts with the Soviet Legation in Cairo. Since August 1948 there has been a Soviet Legation in Tel Aviv, but no reports of its contacts with local party leaders have been received.

In November 1947 it was reported that members of the Slavonic Union, Soviet Section (previously known as the Union of Russian Patriots) would have direct contact with the Central Committee. There are probably contacts with the Jewish Anti-Fascist Committee headquarters in Moscow.

Immigrants (illegal before 15th May, 1948) probably form a direct channel of contact with Soviet Russia, but numerical details are at present impossible to obtain.

13. The P.K.P. had close contact with the French Communists, and through them with the Anti-Fascist League in Moscow, which is the responsibility of a Soviet Minister.

*The Hebrew Communist Party* has had links with the satellite countries, especially Poland.

In Warsaw there is reported to have been set up early in 1947 a "Polish Palestine Friendship Committee." Palestinians who have visited Warsaw have collaborated with this Committee.

At the beginning of 1947 it was reported that the Jewish V-League was to be extended, and that there would be a World Union of Jewish V-Leagues with centres at Tel Aviv, Paris and Moscow.

The Pan-Slav Union has contacts with satellite countries.

Shmuel Mikunis made a tour of Eastern Europe in July 1948.

The P.K.P. made contact with Communists in the United States, when Meir Wilner toured the country in late 1947 and succeeded in collecting substantial sums of money.

There have been reports of Roumanian and German Groups in the P.K.P. The former appear to have been members of the Roumanian Communist Party, to have been partisans during the war, and to number about 50.

The Polish Consulate-General in Tel Aviv developed during 1947 into a centre of Communist activities.

There have also been contacts with Poland by extreme Leftists, *e.g.*, Dr. Moshe Sneh (Mapam), who is not an avowed Communist; he has visited Poland twice within a year.

14. The potentialities of the *Arab* Communists as a fifth column are small.

The *Jewish* Communists, though a small percentage of the total population and with little representation in official bodies, represent a greater threat than their numbers indicate for reasons many of which are clear from the information given above. The Communists' leanings of the Mapam make it an agency of considerable danger. The conditions favourable to them are, in sum, as follows: The state of war or emergency in which armed violence prospers; the tendency of the Jews to spilt into large numbers of political factions; the sympathy for the U.S.S.R. increased by the latter's consistent support for a Jewish State; direct support from the U.S.S.R. and satellite countries in men and probably war materials; the tradition of violence and authoritarianism among a large part of the Jewish population of Palestine.

## TRANSJORDAN

No Communist organisations exist in Transjordan, and attempts by a few individuals to air Communistic theories have been firmly suppressed by the Transjordan authorities. It is probable that the individuals in question were merely seeking notoriety and were not members of any organisation.

A law, published in the *Official Gazette* on 16th May, 1948, makes all activities in favour of communism illegal.

## SYRIA

1. There is no legal Communist Party. It was suppressed on 2nd December, 1947, after four years of overt, but not continuously legalised, existence. The suppression was followed on 18th December by the suppression of all pro-Soviet organisations.

2. The actual membership of illegal Communist movements is estimated at 2,000-2,500 (excluding Armenian Communists—less than 500). Sympathisers are estimated at 15,000-20,000.

3. The percentage of the total population is about .07 per cent. (sympathisers .7 per cent.).

4. The percentage of the electorate is about .15 per cent. (sympathisers 1.5 per cent.).

5. They have no members in the national Parliament.

6. They have no members in the national Government.

7. No Communist stood as such in the July 1947 elections, and no known Communist standing under another banner was elected.



8. In the middle of 1946 it was reported that no trace of Communism appeared in the Syrian Army. At the end of 1947 it was reported that penetration of the Army and of the Military Academy at Homs had been attempted, and that these attempts had the tacit support of the Minister of Defence. If this is so, there has as yet been no evidence of any successful results of penetration. This may be the deliberate policy of the leaders, who are said to be restricting their efforts to propaganda at present.

9. At the end of 1947 an attempt at penetration of the "Deuxième Bureau" was reported.

10. So far as is known they have no influence in the Civil Service.

11. Trade Union organisation is weak; there is no central body, though there is a Damascus Federation of Trade Unions. Communists have made efforts to penetrate the Unions, but an estimate of their membership of the principal Unions (May 1948) puts it at rather less than 1 per cent. (excluding sympathisers and fellow-travellers). On the other hand, in October 1947 Communists were reported to have gained six out of nine places among the newly elected members to the Committee of the Damascus Tailors' Syndicate. It is clearly the policy of the Communists to penetrate the Unions, but so far they have not had much success.

12. Relations with the Soviet Legation in Beirut were maintained even after the suppression of the Party in Syria. This Legation is believed to be a source of funds for the Party.

The Polish Consul in Damascus has been reported to have engaged in "undesirable activities."

The Orthodox Church has certain links with the Russian Orthodox Patriarchate.

13. From 1943 to 1945 the Lebanese and Syrian Communist Parties acted as one body. From June 1945, when the first National Congress was held, the Parties of the two countries became separate. Since suppression in both countries activities have been more closely co-ordinated again.

There has been considerable liaison with other Middle East countries—Iraq, Persia, Egypt, Palestine and Cyprus. Contacts have also been made with the Balkans and France. In October 1947 an emissary was reported to be going to Paris to contact the Comintern; later the Yugoslav Chargé d'Affaires in Beirut was reported to be used as an emissary to the Cominform on his visit to Belgrade.

14. Although the leader of the Syrian Communists, Khalid Biqdash, is said to be Cominform Agent for the Middle East, and is clearly a leading Communist figure in the Middle East, Syrian Communism is not far advanced. Its organisation is poor and it lacks trained cadres. It lost ground during the elections of July 1946, when it did not succeed in gaining a single seat, and the Russian attitude to Palestine since the autumn of 1947 has been disastrous to its cause. It has recently caused disagreement between Khalid Biqdash, who follows the Russian line favouring partition, and Rashid Issa (Secretary of the Damascus Branch), who agrees with the Arab policy which rejects this solution. In April 1948 Biqdash was reported to have given orders that all Party activities must cease until further notice. Many desertions to the Muslim Brotherhood (which has denounced Communism) have been reported. In November 1948 a scheme of reorganisation was reported.

As a political force in present political conditions its influence is negligible. The Party does, however, comprise a number of presumably loyal members who, in a "revolutionary situation," might cause considerable trouble, as they are doubtless well-versed in the Communist revolutionary technique. Other countries whose pre-war percentage of Communists was under 1 per cent. of the population are now under a Communist dictatorship. The danger from fifth-column activities is not altogether a function of the number of known Communists.

## THE LEBANON

1. There is no legal Communist Party. It was suppressed on 8th January, 1948, after four years of overt, though not legalised, existence. Affiliated organisations—the Union of Syndicates and the Society for Cultural Relations with the U.S.S.R.—were also suppressed at about the same time.

2. An estimate of February 1948 puts the membership at 12,000, with sympathisers at 50,000.

3. The percentage of the total population is 1 per cent. (sympathisers 4 per cent.).

4. The percentage of the electorate is 2 per cent. (sympathisers 8 per cent.).

5. They have no members in the national Parliament.

6. They have no members in the national Government.

7. In the May 1947 national elections 17,000 votes were polled for Communist candidates, but the issues before the electorate were much confused and this figure should not be considered as evidence of support.

8. There have been reports of penetration of the armed forces for intelligence purposes.

9. There have been reports of penetration of the Police for intelligence purposes.

10. There have been reports of penetration of the Civil Service, as in 8 and 9 above. There is little doubt that Communist leaders receive advance information of the Government's intentions towards the Party.

11. Penetration of Trade Unions has been considerable. Mustafa Aris, Member of the Central Committee of the Lebanese Communist Party and Middle East Representative on the World Federation of Trade Unions, organised the Communist-controlled "Union of Syndicates" with the object of gaining control of the whole of the Lebanese Trade Union movement. In this he did not succeed, and two anti-Communist groups have emerged—"The League of Workers' Syndicates" and the "Labour Front." Early in 1947 the League consisted of some ten Unions, as opposed to six in the Union of Syndicates, and claimed to be at least as strong as the latter. In September 1947 the Government announced that no Trade Union might operate without an official licence—a measure designed to control Communist penetration. As a result of opposition to this enactment, particularly from Mustafa Aris, who threatened widespread strikes, the Government allowed those Unions already in existence to continue. This concession had the effect of counteracting the Government intention and aiding the Communist Unions, as it was made at a time when they were still fairly strong, but on the decline. The suppression of the Union of Syndicates in January 1948 has reduced its influence to a level far below what it was before, though a newspaper in April 1948 reported that ten Unions had petitioned the President for its recognition: the influence of the non-Communist Unions has consequently increased. Aris was arrested on 19th November, 1948, for organising a demonstration outside the building in Beirut in which the U.N.E.S.C.O. Conference was being held.

12. The Soviet Legation at Beirut has been the centre of Russian contacts with Communist movements in the Levant countries. The Tass representative in the Lebanon has also been actively engaged in Communist contacts and activities. There have been two visits this year from a Cominform representative, and it is reported that the Cominform effort in the Levant States is to be stepped up. Mustafa Aris visited the International Trades Union Conference in Moscow in the autumn of 1946.

13. There have been frequent contacts with other countries in the Middle East, particularly with Syria, from whose Communist Party the Lebanese Communist Party was separated only in 1945. Since the suppression of the Communists of the two countries they have been co-ordinating their activities closely.

In April 1948 there was a conference held in the Lebanon at which Communists from Syria, Iraq and Palestine were present.

In May 1948 negotiations were taking place with the Yugoslav Legation in Beirut to send a delegation to Yugoslavia. It is not known whether the visit took place.

The Cominform are reported to be sending three delegates to visit Middle Eastern countries, and to have asked the Soviet Legation to assist them. There is no news yet of their arrival.

14. During the last year there has been a decline in Communist influence, owing partly to Russian policy in Palestine, and partly to internal dissensions.



The decline was accelerated by the suppression of the Party and affiliated organisations, and there is now a lull in Communist activities. A clandestine newspaper continues to be printed, and has a circulation of about 1,500. There is not a high level of organisation nor highly-trained cadres in the Party, though membership is much larger than in Syria.

It has been reported that a few terrorist groups are being trained in sabotage, the object of their activities, when begun, being to intimidate politicians and others into desisting from anti-Communist activities. The Party's potentialities as a fifth column are, like those of all Communist Parties, considerable, though the numbers who would take part in such activities are unpredictable and would depend on the circumstances of the time.

## IRAQ

1. There is no legal Communist Party. In September 1948, there were two active illegal groups, the Iraqi Communist Party (the Qa'ida group), which is known to have been functioning since January 1947 or earlier, and a splinter group, "Al Haqiqa" (the Truth), whose members are opposed to the Soviet attitude towards Palestine in recognising Israel. In October 1948, the police were able to arrest the leaders of the Iraqi Communist Party and deal a smashing blow to its underground apparatus. In November the Qa'ida press was seized, and by the end of the month the group had virtually ceased to function. Interest has since been concentrated on the Haqiqa. The latest information indicates that Aziz Sherif, the leader of the illegal Hizb ash Sha'ab Party, is actively working on behalf of this group, but there is no definite information as to its strength and influence. Its continued co-operation with the Hizb ash Sha'ab, however, considerably increases its potential danger.

2. Figures of membership are uncertain. Present active membership is certainly not more, probably much less, than 2,000, but the number of fellow-travellers in other parties is believed to be considerably more.

3. This represents .05 per cent. of the total population (based on 1943 census figures, giving total population as 4 million).

4. This represents .2 per cent. of the electorate (very approximately).

5. They have no members in the National Parliament.

6. They have no members in the National Government.

7. It is known that all Communists were encouraged to vote for candidates of the legal Left-wing National Democratic Party at the elections of 1947 and 1948, as were the fellow-travellers of the other illegal Left-wing parties.

8. Communist influence in the Armed Forces is not great; a few non-commissioned officers and men have so far been influenced. The widespread discontent resulting from the Palestine campaign is, however, likely to make the Army ripe for future exploitation.

9. Communist influence in the police is negligible, though one report states that one Commandant of Police in Bagdad is sympathetic. In the north of Iraq there is slightly more influence than in the rest of the country.

10. Reports indicate the existence of cells within the civil administration (including the Railways and Basra Port), and especially in the Education Department. Some influential local Government officials in one or two northern districts are Communists. The Posts and Telegraphs Department has also been penetrated to some extent mostly by members of the National Liberation Party, an illegal body connected with the Qa'ida group.

11. Trades unions in general are not encouraged by the Government and those which exist are small and loosely organised. Where they exist, however, Communist penetration has been considerable. During periods of civil unrest in 1948 Communist strikers and demonstrators from the Shoemakers', Weavers', Tailors', Press Compositors' and Electricians' Unions have been recognised. Communist success has also been achieved in instigating strikes and unrest amongst Railway workers, the Iraq Petroleum Company, Holloway Brothers and other similar concerns, whilst some penetration has also been achieved of the Rafidain Oil Company and the Basra Petroleum Company.

11A. Students have always been fertile material for Communism. During 1948 increased support for Left-wing parties occurred and not a few students were active members of one or other branch of the Communists. They were in the forefront of all riots and demonstrations of January, February and March, 1948, over the political and economic situation, and many were arrested. The significant part they played in the anti-“Portsmouth Treaty” riots led to the formation of a Students’ Union in the early part of 1948, which later developed into a purely Communist organisation. This union has since been inactive.

11B. Iraqi Communists have always made some attempt to disseminate their propaganda amongst the minorities. Some measure of success has been achieved amongst Kurds by the National Liberation Party working through the Kurdish Democratic Party, although this is offset by the Kurdish desire to obtain independence rather than to absorb Communist doctrine. Amongst Armenians also some work has been done, but this has been directed almost exclusively to the repatriation scheme for Soviet Armenia, and there is no evidence of an Armenian Communist Party in Iraq. Some attempts to approach the Assyrian and Turcoman communities have also been made in the past, but without apparent success, and there has been no recent activity. Certain classes of Jews have played their part in the Communist organisation, but there has been no apparent approach to the community as a separate entity.

12. The Soviet Legation in Bagdad has always taken an interest in the various Iraqi Communist and other Left-wing groups. Moral support was given to the Left-wing during the January 1948 riots and the demonstrations over economic and political matters which followed, and to the strikers generally. By commercial enterprise in the import and sale of Russian goods considerable sums of money have been earned by the Legation and are believed to have been spent locally on propaganda and possibly on financial aid to various Left-wing groups.

13. Contact between Iraqi Communists and the Communist Parties of Syria and the Lebanon was known to exist in 1947 and still continues. Similarly, contact existed, and appears still to exist, with Persia by means of the Middle Euphrates pilgrim routes to Ahwaz and so to Tehran. Some traffic in propaganda material and intelligence is known to pass by this route, but any evidence of control exercised through Persia is lacking. The latest indications are, however, that the links between the Persian Tudeh and the “Haqiqa” may be growing stronger. Contact with Syria and the Lebanon is more pronounced, and there has been growing evidence of control and direction from these countries. In October 1948 a joint pamphlet was issued by the Iraqi, Syrian and Lebanese Communist Parties and the Palestinian Arab League of National Liberation upholding Soviet policy in Palestine. It was printed by the Qa’ida press. From time to time there have been reports of Barzan tribesmen sent from Russia penetrating northern Iraq, and some contact with Israel on a minor scale is believed to have taken place.

14. There is little likelihood in the immediately foreseeable future of Iraqi Communists unaided forming a serious fifth-column. They have made progress, but are still lacking in popular and powerful leadership, political influence and party cohesion. Furthermore, there is a powerful nationalist element in Iraq which, whilst strongly opposed to British and American influence, is just as antagonistic to Russian interference of any kind. On the other hand, governmental and commercial corruption, scarcity of food and a slackening of trade have worsened the workers’ standard of living; the minority questions are no further towards being solved; and there are still in the towns unemployed who will not do agricultural work. Such conditions have been and will in the future be fully exploited by Communists for their own purpose.

## PERSIA

1. No legal Communist Party exists. The Tudeh Party is, however, Communist in most respects, although it supports the Persian Constitution. Government opposition has driven it underground, although it is not strictly an illegal Party.\*

\* The Party was declared illegal on the 5th February, 1949, as the result of an attempt on the Shah’s life carried out by one of its members.



2. Reliable membership figures are non-existent. The number of active members (as distinct from potential supporters) is almost certainly not more than 20,000-40,000. The initiation of more effective police control in the autumn of 1948 undoubtedly caused a considerable shrinkage in the Party's ranks.

3. This represents, very roughly, .05 per cent. or less of the total population.

4. This represents, very roughly, .2 per cent. of the electorate.

5. There are no members in the National Parliament (Majlis). The Party decided to boycott the 1947 elections, but eight Tudeh Deputies (out of 136) were elected to the Fourteenth Majlis, which held office from 1944 to 1946.

6. Similarly, there are now no members in the Government. Three Tudeh Ministers held office from August to October 1946 under Qawam as-Sultaneh.

7. See (5) above.

(8) There is little evidence of Tudeh influence in the Armed Forces, although in August 1945 the Party was responsible for instigating a serious mutiny in the Meshed garrison.

9. The Police Training School in Tehran was reported (May 1948) to be a Tudeh propaganda centre. Otherwise there is no evidence of Tudeh support in the Police Force.

10. Tudeh influence in the Civil Service is negligible (probably non-existent).

11. The Party makes its strongest appeal through the trade unions which it controls. In April 1948 it was estimated that about one-third of the industrial population of Tehran and Isfahan (the two largest towns) were members of or active sympathisers with the Tudeh unions (of which the Railway Workers' Union is probably the most powerful). In the autumn of 1948 the supporters of the Party were almost entirely confined to the industrial section of the population, and this state of affairs is likely to persist. The Tudeh instigated the serious strike in the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company's Abadan refinery in July 1946. Thereafter, the Party's hold on the A.I.O.C. employees weakened, although the most recent information indicates a marked revival. It is reliably reported that there are now about 135 active cells (mostly about five to ten strong) in the A.I.O.C. area.

11A. The Tudeh Party has a Youth Organisation of the para-military kind which may be potentially dangerous, but has so far not come into violent conflict with the authorities. In September 1948 the Tudeh Youth boasted that under its guidance 4,000 young people were studying Communism in Persia.

12. Direct contact has been maintained with the Soviet Embassy in Tehran, which has undoubtedly financed and guided the Party and probably continues to do so.

13. There appears to be some liaison between the Tudeh and the Iraqi Communists groups (see under Iraq).

14. The power of the Tudeh is latent rather than overt. Under able leadership it will continue to make an appeal to the ill-fed, ill-clad masses, unless Government social services are improved. The chief danger-spot at present is undoubtedly the province of Khuzistan, which contains the A.I.O.C. fields and refinery, but there are no signs of a major rising. It must be remembered that the country as a whole is strongly opposed to the idea of increased Soviet influence. The Party's connection with the Soviet Union and the Government's hostility towards it are, therefore, the chief factors which prevent its further expansion.

## BURMA

1. There are three indigenous Communist Parties, viz. :—

(a) The Burma Communist Party ("White" Communists), led by Thakin Than Tun. Though the Party is not actually illegal, the majority of its members have been outlawed by the Government and are now in a state of rebellion.

- (b) The Communist Party (Burma) ("Red Flag" Communists), led by Thakin Soe (now under arrest), which broke away from the original Party in February 1946 and was declared illegal by the Government of Burma in January 1947; the grounds of difference between the Parties are largely personal, though Thakin Soe was always more extreme than Than Tun.
- (c) The Union of Burma Communist Party (or Union C.P.), formed by the Socialist ex-Minister of Commerce, U Ko Ko Gyi, after he was dismissed from office on a charge of corruption in July 1948.

2.—(a) The Burma Communist Party membership is probably about 4,000, spread throughout the country and carefully organised into district, township and village committees; but the membership of affiliated organisations is considerably more, viz. :—

*All-Burma Peasants' Union* claims a membership of 300,000; though probably this is double the true figure, the Union has enabled Burma Communist Party influence to dominate the country from Pegu to Mandalay and also considerable areas of the Irrawaddy Delta.

*Democratic People's Youth League*, which is the former Red Guard under a new name (the new designation being a means of circumventing Government orders regarding military organisations), has a strength of about 20,000.

*All-Burma Women's Congress* is closely connected with the Burma Communist Party, but the extent of its influence is not known.

In addition, some influential organisations, though not actually under Party control, are known to contain Communist sympathisers among their leaders, viz. :—

*Rangoon University Students' Union*, many of whose members are sympathetic to Communism.

*All-Burma Students' Union*, which is affiliated to the Communist-controlled International Union of Students.

*All-Burma Indian Youth League*, affiliated to the World Federation of Democratic Youth and which includes among its officials a number of disciples of Than Tun's associate, Ghosal.

The "White Band" section of the People's Volunteer Organisation is strongly sympathetic to the Burma Communist Party and is in a state of rebellion against the Government owing to the latter's refusal to come to terms with the Communists.

(b) *The Communist Party (Burma)* was estimated in August 1948 to have a membership of 2,000; it is thought, however, that this figure includes a fair proportion of dacoits. The organisation of this Party has been seriously damaged by the arrest of the majority of its leaders, but scattered bands of "Red Flags" continue to operate in Arakan, the Irrawaddy Delta and in the districts along the Irrawaddy River in central Burma. It would appear that former estimates of this Party's decline in activity were premature.

(c) *The Union of Burma Communist Party* is a small concern of which there is no information of value.

3. The strict party membership of the Burma Communist Party is about 0.25 per cent. of total population.

4. The final figures for the last elections (to the Constituent Assembly in April 1947) have not been made public, but it is estimated that less than 10 per cent. of votes cast were given to the Communists.

5. Seven Communists were elected to the Constituent Assembly in 1947, i.e., 3.3 per cent. of total members. The number of fellow-travellers is not known.

6. There are no Communists in the Government but undoubtedly some of the Ministers are sympathetic to Communist ideas, particularly to those in the writings of Mao Tse-tung.

7. No Communists have stood for by-elections since the general election of 1947.



8.—(a) The new Burma Army contains a large proportion of personnel taken over from the late Aung San's private army, and there is a strong Leftist tendency in this element. Of the five infantry battalions composed mainly of this type, approximately one and a half battalions deserted in August 1948 at the instigation of senior officers known to be Communist sympathisers; these formations were later defeated by loyal troops and their members have scattered. There is thought to be some Communist sympathy among the remaining battalions recruited from the same source. The 2 Chin, 3 Karen and 3 Kachin battalions are dependable, and 2 of the Burman battalions are also said to be trustworthy.

(b) The air force appears to be non-Communist, but it is thought that the theft of a naval launch from Rangoon harbour by the Communists in August indicates the presence of Communist sympathisers in the navy.

9. Senior officers of the police are known to be anti-Communist. Small-scale desertions have occurred among the lower ranks, but it appears that Communist influence is not wide-spread.

10. Communism makes little appeal to the higher grades of the civil service, which, in general, are opposed to the disorders which the Communists have fomented, but there is sympathy with the Communists among the ill-paid clerical grades. Numerical estimates are not available.

11. The trade union movement is in its infancy. The Communist-controlled All-Burma T.U.C. comprises only about 2,000 workers, divided among ten unions, all in the Rangoon area. Most of its leading agitators are under arrest.

12. No direct contacts with Soviet Russia are known; indirect contact may be maintained through the Indian Communist Party.

13.—(a) Communication by letter and exchange of literature has gone on with the Communist Parties in Malaya, Geneva, Australia, Poland, Belgrade, Hungary, Belgium, Canada, Cyprus, Paris and Cape Town, but at present the authorities are intercepting postal communications.

(b) H. N. Ghosal (alias Yebaw Ba Tin), an Indian educated in Burma, returned to Burma after the war as the link between the Indian Communist Party and the Burma Communist Party. It is probable that the Burma Communist Party has received much advice and instruction from the C.P.I. by this means.

(c) Leading Burma Communists attended the C.P.I. Conference in Calcutta in February 1948, and in the course of the conference two of them, believed to be Than Tun and Ba Thein Tin, both of the Burma Communist Party Politburo, had a secret conference with Australian, Czech and French Communist delegates.

(d) During 1948 two C.P.I. leaders are reported to have visited Burma via Assam; it is stated by Indian authorities that the C.P.I. hopes to receive arms and munition from the Burma Communists, and expects the Burma revolt to spread to Assam.

(e) Indian reports state that regular communication is maintained between the Indian and Burma Communists via Manipur and via Chittagong.

(f) There has been correspondence between the Communist Party (Burma) and the Viet Nam news service in Bangkok.

(g) Miss Brickman, the English Communist; Dusan Puhalo, from Yugoslavia; and Sen Shiu Hwa, from China, visited Burma after the C.P.I. Conference in Calcutta early in 1948 and attended the All-Burma Peasants' Union Congress at Pyinmana in March.

(h) In 1945 Communists in the British reoccupation forces made contact with Burma Communists and gave them much assistance and advice in organisation, &c.; communism in Burma owes much of its vitality to this regrettable episode. The connexion is said to have been maintained. Members of the Burma Communist Party attended the British Empire Communist Conference in March 1947.

(i) The Burma Communist Party leader, Than Tun, recently advocated co-operation with the Chinese Communists; this could be effected through Communists among the Chinese community in Burma or by trans-frontier communication with Communists in Yunnan. Than Tun and Ghosal are reported to have attended a Communist conference at Kengtung, bordering Yunnan, French Indo-China and Siam, in October 1948.

14. Communists in Burma could do great damage by way of sabotage of communications—always easy in a relatively undeveloped country—and by infiltration into the armed forces. At the moment, however, they are in a state of active rebellion.

## CHINA

Owing to the uncertain and rapidly changing conditions in China no effective revision of this section of the Survey is feasible at the moment.

## FRENCH INDO-CHINA

1.—(a) The Communist Party of Indo-China was never recognised as legal by the French authorities.

In November 1945 it was nominally absorbed in the Viet Minh League, but the Viet Minh itself is dominated by a small group of Communists and may be regarded as a Communist organisation.

(b) Among the Chinese the Communist Party of China is active and till lately was allowed considerable scope by the French, who hoped to play the Communists off against the Kuo Min Tang, but late in 1948 the French changed their policy and besides closing one or two centres in Cholon expelled some fifteen leaders.

2.—(a) The Viet Minh is said to have a membership of 4,000, but there are numerous affiliated peasants, probably amounting to some hundreds of thousands.

(b) The Chinese Communist Party probably number about 5,000.

3.—(a) Of the total population of French Indo-China, the Viet Minh party amounts to 0·017 per cent., but of the total population of Vietnam (*i.e.*, Indo-China excluding Cambodia and Laos) about 0·021 per cent.

(b) The Chinese Communist Party numbers about 1·5 per cent. of the Chinese population as recorded in the census, but the census figure includes only Chinese who are foreign nationals.

4. The Viet Minh claims to have held elections and to have secured 90 per cent. of votes cast.

5. The Viet Minh National Assembly is dominated by the Communists.

6. There are no Communists in the French-controlled Provisional Central Government, but six of the Ministers of the rebel Viet Minh administration are Communists.

7. See paragraph 4 above.

8. The Viet Minh army, which is controlled by a Communist commander, numbers about 85,000.

There is said to be an organisation in France which persuades Communists in the French forces to volunteer for service in Indo-China and then to desert to the Viet Minh, but no numerical estimate of such desertions is available.

9. Outside the towns controlled by the French, such police as exist are said to be effectively controlled by the Communists.

10. There is a Leftist tendency among the indigenous civil servants, but it is not possible to estimate how many are Communists. Outside the areas held by the French, the administration is dominated by the Communists.

11. There is little trade union activity.

12. The Viet Minh leader, Ho Chi Minh, has visited Russia on more than one occasion; he also worked with Borodin in China and was connected with the school for revolutionaries, organised by Borodin, at Whampoa, near Canton.

Other Viet Minh leaders have similar records.

13. The Viet Minh has military training camps in Siam; arms are received from both Siam and China. The Viet Minh has representatives in Bangkok, Rangoon, Calcutta and Paris, and the Viet Minh News Service has offices in Rangoon, Bangkok, Singapore and Hong Kong. The Chinese Communists maintain contact with the Party in China.

14. Most Annamites are anti-Communist and the grant of a real measure of independence by the French might destroy Communist influence, which at present depends on Viet Minh's claim to represent Annamite nationalism. But unless such a settlement is arrived at by the French, it is quite likely that the Viet



Minh will succeed in gaining control of the whole country and setting up a Communist Government throughout Indo-China. In the latter case, Communist fifth-columnism would, of course, be superfluous; in the former case the Communists might be a danger to the stability of the independent Vietnam State.

## INDONESIA

1. The Dutch have proscribed Communism, but Communist Parties were recognised by the Republican Government.

The orthodox Communists rebelled against the Republican Government in September 1948 and were crushed; but the Trotskyist leader, Tan Malakka, then formed a new "Partai Moerba" (Proletarian Party) which received the approval of the Republican Government.

2. Estimates of the number of Communists have varied from as little as 2,000 to as many as 125,000 (including 25,000 Chinese); the higher figure, derived from Dutch sources, is certainly much exaggerated.

3. Taking the maximum estimate of 125,000 the percentage of Communists in the population is .18.

4. No electorate has yet been defined.

5. No national Parliament now exists.

6. There are no Communists in the Dutch Administration.

Some of the members of the late Republican administration have in the past displayed sympathy with Communist ideas; *e.g.*, Dr. Hatta, late Prime Minister, is said by the Dutch to have attended the School for Revolutionaries at Tashkent, but he is not now a Communist.

7. There have been no elections.

8. There is no evidence of infiltration into the Dutch or Dutch-controlled forces.

Communist influence was reported to be strong in the Republican army and some desertions occurred at the time of the Communist rebellion in September 1948, but most of the army remained loyal to the Republican Government. The Republican army appears now to have dissolved owing to the recent action of the Dutch.

9. No reliable evidence is available about communism among the police.

10. No reliable evidence is available about communism in the civil service.

11. According to Dutch reports the Sobsi (central organisation of labourers in the Republic) and the Sarboepri (organisation of agricultural unions in the Republic) were dominated by Communists; these two organisations controlled some 2,500,000 workers. The future of these organisations is now in doubt.

12. The leaders of the rising in September 1948, Moeso, Soeripno and Alimin, all had direct contact with the Russians—Moeso and Alimin in Moscow and Soeripno in Prague.

Tan Malakka has also been in Russia, but his Trotskyist tendency probably implies that he now has no Russian connexions.

13.—(a) The Indonesian office in Prague has been in contact with Communists there.

(b) The Czech Consul in New Delhi is said by the Dutch to be the channel of communication between the Indonesian office in Prague and Indonesia.

(c) The Dutch state that the Indonesian Communists maintain contact with Russia through Dr. Soedarsono, Republican representative in New Delhi, and also by means of wireless.

(d) An Indonesian delegation attended the Congress of the World Federation of Democratic Youth in Warsaw in August 1948.

(e) Indonesian students are in touch with the International Union of Students.

(f) The Republican information service in Amsterdam is reported by the Dutch to be partly staffed by Communists.

(g) There is certainly communication with Communists in Australia, whence Communist literature is obtained.

(h) Propaganda material is said also to reach Indonesia through the Philippines.

(i) There is contact with the Communist Party of Malaya.

(j) The Dutch state that Communists in the British forces of occupation in 1945-46 did much to encourage communism in the Indies (as certainly was the case in Burma also); the connexion thus established is no doubt still maintained.

(k) The Indonesian news service in Bangkok has its office in the same building as the Viet Nam news service.

14. Though the Dutch issue alarmist reports, it appears that so far communism has made little appeal in Indonesia, where the powerful *Masjoemi* (Muslim) Party is anti-Communist. Communism has little hold outside some of the towns and the recent rebellion against the Republic was easily crushed. It is, however, possible that the collapse of Republican ambitions may drive influential nationalists into the Communist camp through a sense of frustration—as has already occurred with, for example, Sjarifoeddin. If this should occur on any scale, communism might be a real danger to the future United States of Indonesia.

## JAPAN

1. There is a legal Communist Party in Japan. It was banned before the war, but was reborn in 1945 when General MacArthur ordered the release of political prisoners in Japan.

2. Reported membership figures are:—

		<i>March</i>	<i>October</i>
	<i>1947</i>	<i>1948</i>	<i>1948</i>
Registered members ...	16,200	18,088	?
Unregistered (covert) ...	300	...	47,000
Adherents (approx.) ...	80,000	...	100,000
Total ...	96,500	18,088	c. 165,000

There are indications that since November 1948 many covert members have openly entered the party and registered so as to give the impression of rapid growth. Recent figures are not yet available.

3. 165,000 forms 20 per cent. of the population of 80 million.

4. The same figure forms 40 per cent. of the electorate of 40 million.

5. Communist representation in the House of Councillors is 4 members or 1.6 per cent.

Communist representation in the House of Representatives has risen as a result of the elections of 23rd January, 1949, from 4 (86 per cent.) to 36 members (7.7 per cent.).

6. There are no Communists in the Cabinet.

7. In the general election of 23rd January, 1949, the Communist vote is reported as 9.5 per cent. of votes cast or about 6.7 per cent. of all eligible voters. In the local elections for the new Boards of Education held on 5th October, 1948, where the Communists prophesied their own success they secured only 2 of the 296 seats. In the general election of 1947 they obtained 3.4 per cent. of the votes. In the local elections at the same time they obtained 1 per cent. It seems established that many voters who will vote for a little-known Communist in a large constituency will not vote for a known local Communist in a minor local election.

8. There are no Japanese armed forces.

9. Communist influence in the police is negligible.

10. Communist influence in the Civil Service is exerted through the Government workers' trade union organisations. Of these unions, the Government Railway Workers' Union (*Kokutetsu Rodo Kumiai*) has not fallen under Communist domination although strenuous efforts have been made, with varying degrees of success, to extend Communist influence. The All-Japan Communication



Workers' Union (Zenkoku Teishin Rodo Kumiai) is Communist dominated. In the Central Executive Committee of the Japan Teachers' Union only 9 of the 81 members are openly Communists, although in some matters this Union follows the party line.

11. Of the six million odd union members in Japan, divided among thousands of Unions, some 1.2 million (June 1948) are subordinated to the National Congress of Industrial Unions, in which the rigid Communist central control has provoked the creation of a powerful anti-Communist "Democratisation League" which hopes in the course of time to wean much of the membership away from the Communist leading minority. The other large organisation, the General Federation of Trade Unions (1 million members, June 1948), has not been seriously invaded by the Communists and remains associated with the Socialists. Of the unaffiliated unions, only a few have been subjected to serious Communist infiltration. The rank and file even in the N.C.I.U. are not, in intention, supporters of Communism.

12. Some Japanese Communist leaders visit the Soviet Mission in Tokyo. Others are believed to keep in more constant contact with Tass representatives, who are themselves in close touch with the Soviet Mission. Only seven of the party headquarters' staff appear to have lived in Russia.

Direct contact between the now Soviet territory of Sakhalin or the southern Kuriles and Hokkaido is also alleged to exist.

Further contact appears to be maintained via North Korea, although there is no proof that this channel provides more than a means of smuggling goods which are sold for the benefit of the party.

13. Contact is close with the powerful "League of Koreans Residing in Japan" and it is assumed that through them contact is maintained with the Korean Communists. The war-time residence of Nozaka, one of the two chief Japanese Communists, in Chinese Communist territory suggests that some Chinese connections are also maintained.

14. The Communists are well placed and organised for attempts to sabotage Japanese industry, but on the other hand the occupation forces and the Japanese police have had such ample opportunities for intelligence of Communist organisation and plans as to enable them to take effective counter-measures before any foreseeable emergency. In Hokkaido the Communists possess some "strong-arm" bands and many of the 600,000 Koreans in Japan can, if required, be stirred up to violence in the Communist interest. Nevertheless the great majority of Japanese distrust the Russians, dislike Communism and would, in an emergency, co-operate with the occupation forces, with the police or with their own Government to curb any serious attempt by the Communists to subvert law and order.

## SOUTH KOREA

1. There is a legal Communist Party in South Korea, but, owing to the opprobrium which its actions have brought upon it, it has changed its name to the "South Korean Labour Party."

2. The Party consists of:—

- (a) Agents of the "North Korean Labour Party" or of the Russians, some sent from the north, others recruited locally.
- (b) Their paid supporters. Crowds at Leftist demonstrations have been paid at the rate of 200 yen per head for one attendance.
- (c) Volunteers who hope to increase their power by supporting the Party.
- (d) Convinced Communists.

The excesses committed by the Party have reduced this last category to negligible dimensions. The other groups are variable in size, especially the paid supporters. In May last year more than 75 per cent. of the electorate voted for non-Communists. The remainder of the electorate included supporters of the Left and Centre Parties (who boycotted the election) besides those who were unable or too indifferent to vote. The Communist supporters were also among those who

did not vote and thus clearly formed an extremely small proportion of the electorate at that time, almost certainly less than 5 per cent., and possibly less than 1 per cent.\*

3. See under (2) above. The Communist proportion of the total population is probably less than 3 per cent. and possibly less than 0.7 per cent.

4. See under (2) above. The Communist proportion of the electorate is less than 5 per cent. and possibly less than 1 per cent.

5. There are no overt Communists in the new South Korea elected Assembly. On controversial matters, however, a number of representatives will usually vote in the Communist interest and a small number of these may be either in sympathy with or in the pay of the Communists.

6. There are no Communists in the Government.

7. Figures for Communists in local councils are not available.

8. At the time of the Yosu revolt the "constabulary"—the embryonic armed forces—were found to be inefficient owing not only to inadequate training but also to Communist infiltrations.

9. Some sections of the police have shown themselves to be devoted to Right-wing politicians and they are generally opposed to the Communists with whom they have had many fights. A recent report, however, states that evidence now exists of Communist infiltration into the police. This infiltration nevertheless seems still insignificant; and during and since the Yosu revolt in efficiency and loyalty they have contrasted favourably with the constabulary.

10. Figures for Communists in the Administration are not available.

11. In the Trade Unions the Communists have been active and have succeeded in imposing themselves on a number of factories. The Right-wing has done the same and is believed to control rather more workers than the Communists. The latter have used their power almost entirely for political and subversive purposes, causing riots in Seoul and other towns as well as on the railways. Owing to the agricultural nature of South Korea the effectiveness of these tactics has been limited.

12. The leader of the South Korean Labour Party lives in North Korea to maintain better contact with his Korean and Russian masters as well as for his own safety.

One of the major plots in South Korea was organised by M. Shabshin, director of the Political Department of Soviet Headquarters in North Korea, while he was a guest in the American Zone as a member of the Soviet Delegation to the Joint Commission.

13. Contact with Chinese Communists is via North Korea.

14. The only weakness of this Party as a fifth-column in South Korea lies in the antipathy it has aroused among the local population. Its greatest success so far has been in Quelpart Island (Korean: Cheju; Japanese: Saishu) where in May rioters succeeded in upsetting the elections in two of the three electoral districts. It is doubtless no mere coincidence that the only two districts in which Communists were strong enough to achieve this were in an island of great strategic value to Russia.

The Yosu revolt in the south-west, which started on 18th October, 1948, was virtually quelled in ten days. Since then there has been steady armed infiltration in the mountain ranges across the 38th parallel. Official estimates of the extent of this and other subversive activity are violently contradictory and unreliable. In general, however, it is clear that despite many grave political and economic weaknesses, which could of themselves injure or destroy the Republic of Korea, the specifically Communist danger lies not with residents in the southern territories, but with the agents, arms, money or troops which the Russians or the Korean Communist Government may send in from North Korea. These are already producing a simulated "fifth-column" which is claimed by the Communists to

\* The only figures available for Party strengths in South Korea are those supplied by the parties. Their total much exceeds the total population, and the Communists' figures are at least as unreliable as those of other parties.



presage a general revolt. Its artificial nature, however, distinguishes it sharply from the normal conception of a "fifth-column" as a subversive movement organised on a basis of spontaneous enthusiasm for an alternative régime on the part of sections of the resident population.

## PHILIPPINES

1. In 1932 the Supreme Court of the Philippines declared the Communist Party to be an illegal association. Since the war the party has existed openly but the distribution of propaganda is punishable and Communist literature is apparently seized by the authorities.

The main strength of Communism in the Philippines lies, however, in the Hukbalahap and P.K.M. organisations, in which the Communists hold important positions and wield considerable influence. These organisations were declared illegal under the late President Roxas and the amnesty granted them on 15th April, 1948, under President Quirino expired after four months without having produced any permanent change in their status.

2. Membership of the P.K.M. (National Peasants' Union) is reported as 150,000 and of the C.L.O. (Congress of Labour Organisations) as 80,000, but only a proportion of these are Communists or even specifically Communist sympathisers.

3. Since the total population is 19 million, the Communists constitute less than 1 per cent. Sympathisers with the agrarian unrest led by the Hukbalahaps and to some extent influenced by the Communists may at times have amounted to 10 per cent.

4. See the preceding paragraph.

5. The Democratic Alliance (an organisation of the "Popular Front" type, now defunct) won 6 seats out of approximately 100 in the House of Representatives elections in 1945, but information is not available on whether any of the six representatives were avowed Communists. Luis Taruc, Commander-in-Chief of the Hukbalahap, finally took his seat on 26th June, 1948, as a result of the amnesty. He left Manila again for the mountains in early August after publicly affirming his own Communism while denying allegations that the Hukbalahap and P.K.M. were Communist organisations. The legislature appears to contain no other Communists.

6. There are no known Communists in the Government.

7. Figures of voting in recent elections are not available.

8. There are no known Communists in the Government forces, though there are some American deserters in the Hukbalahap forces.

9. There are no known Communists in the Police.

10. There are no known Communists in the Civil Service.

11. The Philippines are not highly industrialised, but such Trade Unions as there are are strongly influenced by the Communist-dominated Congress of Labour Organisations. This, however, affects the city of Manila rather than the country as a whole. Its membership has been reported as 80,000, but more recently as between 30,000 and 50,000. The President is believed to be a "fellow-traveller," while one of its Vice-Presidents is Secretary-General of the Communist Party of the Philippines.

12. Although Communist leaders in the Hukbalahap are reported to receive money from Russia, their chief sources of funds appear to be banditry, blackmail, the Chinese Communists and American Communist or Left-wing organisations, in the order given.

13. The Chinese in the Philippines provide links with the Communists in China. The American Merchant Marine is reported to bring \$6,000 monthly from the Communist Party in America, who also lend occasional public moral support to the agrarian revolutionaries in the islands.

14. The Hukbalahap is a powerful, armed guerrilla organisation formerly controlling some four rice-growing provinces north of Manila in central Luzon. It was created to fight the Japanese, but has subsequently fought the Government. It resisted efficiently till this summer though the range of its activity was slowly being narrowed. Its inspiration and strength were in the endemic agrarian unrest. Its arms were acquired from American wartime supplies to guerrillas, and increased by captures from the Japanese and by other nefarious means. Some of its leaders were Communists and Communist experience was reflected in the form of the organisation. It is, however, doubtful whether the members would ever have fought for any motive save their own profit or agrarian reform.

Communist efforts to organise a United Front in politics had some success during the war, but none thereafter. The more ambitious Democratic Alliance which followed showed less Communist influence in its leadership and organisation; it has also dissolved.

The latest organisation, the P.K.M., seems little more than a political counterpart to the Hukbalahap forces, operating within the radius of Hukbalahap protection. It has shown much Communist influence (its flag is red with a white scythe and the letters "P.K.M.") and it purports to set up a complete system of central and local government on semi-Communist lines.

Among the semi-literate peasantry Communist political ideals are slow to take root, and the only ally on whom Russia might be able to rely within the Philippines would seem to be the Hukbalahap. So long as the guerrillas could be made to feel that they were fighting for their own interests against the usurers and grasping landlords they would be likely to accept alliance with, and some guidance from, the Communists. Under a threat of Russian or Chinese Communist domination their reactions would almost certainly be different.

## SIAM

1. The law banning Communism was repealed in 1946.

(a) Nothing was heard of any Siamese Communist Party till August 1948, though one or two Siamese, men without influence or reputation, professed Communist views. In August 1948 information was received of the existence of a Siamese Communist organisation with headquarters in Bangkok and branches in twelve provinces, chiefly in the towns of north-east Siam; but the existence of this organisation remains unconfirmed.

There is a Siamese newspaper, the *Mahaahon*, of Communist sympathies, published weekly in Bangkok, and the weekly *Kana Sangkom Niyom* (i.e., *Socialism*) is pro-Soviet.

(b) The Chinese Communist Party is active among the Chinese of Siam in Bangkok and the north-eastern towns.

2.—(a) The Siamese organisation was reported to have 3,560 members, the leaders being half-Chinese or half-Indo-Chinese, mainly journalists, lawyers or teachers; the pure Siamese element was not strong.

(b) The Chinese Communist Party has probably about 2,000 actual Party members, though their numbers have been estimated at as much as 5,000.

3.—(a) Membership of the Siamese organisation is about 0.03 per cent. of Siamese.

(b) Chinese Communists form about 0.05 per cent. of Chinese population of Siam.

4. The number of Communists among the electorate is negligible.

5. There are no Communists in the National Parliament.

6. The present Government is anti-Communist and has deported a number of Chinese agitators.

7. No Communist votes have been recorded in recent elections.

8. Communism has no influence in the armed forces.

9. Communism has no influence in the police.

10. Communism has no influence in the Civil Service.



11. The Chinese Communists have much influence among the Central Labour Union, which is mainly Chinese; Chinese Communist agents have much influence in general among the coolie labour at the docks and rice-mills of Bangkok and could incite a strike of about 100,000 persons.

12. The Russian Legation, established in Bangkok in 1948, is believed to be in contact with local Communists, but has so far been cautious in its relations with them; the Legation's press service issues material to the Siamese newspapers, but there is no evidence that money passes. There are persistent reports that young Siamese have been sent abroad, perhaps to Russia, for training in Communist technique, but it is possible that these are really only Free Siamese who have gone to China.

13.—(a) The Siamese Communist organisation is believed to be in contact with the Communists in French Indo-China.

(b) The Chinese Communist Party in Siam is an off-shoot of the Party in China and appears to be in contact with Chinese Communists throughout South-East Asia.

Chinese Communists from Malaya take refuge on the Siamese side of the frontier, and armed Chinese Communists are reported to have gone to the frontier to assist in the Malayan troubles, but this last point is not confirmed.

14.—(a) Amongst Siamese, fifth-columnist activity is unlikely.

(b) Amongst Chinese, Communist agents, by arousing agitation among the coolie labour in Bangkok, could dislocate the economy and life of the capital, which are all-important to the welfare of the whole country.

The Chinese Communists would also probably be willing to aid the Free Siamese against the present Government in the hope of thus creating a state of chaos.

(c) The Malay separatist movement in South Siam is believed to be non-Communist, but the movement might see advantage in aiding the Chinese Communist operations along the frontier if it despairs of achieving its aims otherwise.





